E.H. Butler Library at Buffalo State College

Digital Commons at Buffalo State
Creative Studies Graduate Student Master's Projects

International Center for Studies in Creativity

5-2009

Emotions as an Intervening Variable in the Creative
Process
Diego E. Uribe Larach
Buffalo State College

To learn more about the International Center for Studies in Creativity and its educational programs,
research, and resources, go to http://creativity.buffalostate.edu/.
Recommended Citation
Larach, Diego E. Uribe, "Emotions as an Intervening Variable in the Creative Process" (2009). Creative Studies Graduate Student
Master's Projects. Paper 39.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/creativeprojects
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

i

Emotions as an Intervening
Variable in the Creative Process
by
Diego E. Uribe Larach

An Abstract of a Thesis
in
Creative Studies

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Science
May 2009

Buffalo State College
State University of New York
Department of Creative Studies

ii
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Emotions as an Intervening Variable in the Creative Process
This thesis explored the impact that emotionally laden stimuli had on individuals’
creative process and creative products as assessed by independent domain experts. Sixtyfive undergraduate students were randomly separated into three treatment conditions and
instructed to create an artistic collage composition on the theme of New Year’s Eve. Two
of the treatment groups received, in addition to the general instructions set, a text based
priming stimulus that was either an emotionally laden narrative or factual narrative about
New Year’s Eve. All participants were asked to complete a task reflection questionnaire
and the FourSight cognitive style measure. Using the Consensual Assessment Technique
framework, six independent domain experts rated each collage in 18 distinct dimensions
including Creativity. Although there was no significant difference in the Creativity Scale
score between the three treatments groups (the group that received the emotional
narrative was hypothesized to outperform the other two groups), an interaction effect
emerged between the presence of the emotionally laden narrative and two of FourSight’s
cognitive style preferences, which modulated creative performance. Implications of these
findings are discussed as well as limitations and recommendations for future research
efforts in the topic of emotion and creative cognition.
___________________________________
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CHAPTER ONE: RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the context that shaped this research
study. In doing so, a rationale is provided in support of carrying out this research study
and finally, the research question and hypotheses are outlined.

Research Study’s Context
Life in the 21st century can be distinguished from past periods of time by the
pervasive influence of computer technology at every level of human interaction.
Computer technology has expanded and offered revolutionary new angles to the scientific
study of creativity such as artificial intelligence (Boden, 2004, Hofstadter, 1995) and
neuroscience (Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004; Flaherty 2005; Stein 2007) in contrast to
the prevailing (and traditional) cognitive psychology approach. On one hand, artificial
intelligence researchers have tried to understand creativity by computer modeling of
cognitive processes associated with the creative process. On the other hand
neuroscientists, with the use of sophisticated computer imaging technology, have probed
deep into the brain of individuals while engaged in creative tasks with the hopes of
identifying brain functions, patterns and regions associated with creative production.
What is interesting about these 21st century approaches to the study of creativity is
that, although they have confirmed many of the models and theories proposed by the
cognitive-behavioral sciences approach, they still have not provided a clear-cut blueprint
of the creative phenomenon. While specific cognitive processes have been replicated with
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the use of artificial intelligence algorithms and scanned through neuroimaging studies,
researchers in both of these fields agree that much of the ambiguity around the
mechanisms of creativity reside in the role of emotion in creative cognition (Boden,
1998, 2004; Damasio 1994, 2001; Stein, 2007). For example, Boden (1998) was
emphatic in stating that while artificial intelligence has been fairly successful in
replicating critical creative processes such exploration of conceptual spaces and
analogical/combinatorial processes, it still fails in modeling the evaluative processes and
decision making processes that are governed by emotion and motivation. From the field
of neuroscience similar evidence points to the fact that while the ability to generate many
novel associations and combinations is desirable for creative production, the above is
useless if humans do not have the ability to evaluate and make decisions, which precisely
calls upon emotional decision-making brain mechanisms (Damasio, 2001; Naqvi, Shiv &
Bechara, 2006). Furthermore, recent studies in neuroscience point to a tight interplay
between emotion and cognition, in which brain emotional functions and regions play
critical roles in core cognitive processes such as attention, memory encoding, and
memory retrieval (Duncan & Barret, 2007) all of which are critical to the creative process
(Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmonm, & Doares, 1991).
Although evidence coming from different fields of study point to emotion as a
critical ingredient of the creative phenomenon, the cognitive science paradigm, the
dominant paradigm governing the last several decades of psychological research, has
systematically neglected the study of emotion (LeDoux, 1996). The scientific study and
modeling of the creative process has been no exception to this research approach (Runco,
2007). For example, the Creative Problem Solving process (Isaksen, Dorval & Treffinger,
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2000; Noller, Parnes, & Biondi, 1976; Osborn, 1963; Parnes, 1981; Puccio, Murdock, &
Mance, 2005; Treffinger, Isaksen, & Dorval, 1994), central to the Creative Studies
curriculum dictated at the International Center for Studies in Creativity, and one of the
most widely studied creative process models, falls into the category of the cognitiverational-semantic theories of creativity (Treffinger, Isaksen, & Firestien, 1983).
Governed by this ruling paradigm, the large body of research regarding the role of
emotion in creativity has focused mostly in peripherals areas to creativity such as
motivation, the creative drive and the affective states that are conducive to creativity
(Amabile, 1985; Boden, 1998; Collins & Amabile, 1999; Damasio, 2001; Flaherty, 2005;
Hennessey, 1999; Levine, 2007; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Runco 2007; Salovey & Mayer,
1990; Treffinger, 1980).
Only in recent years, researchers in the field of creativity are converging to the
fact that to have a full understanding of the creative phenomenon, both cognitive and
affective dimensions of creativity and the way these two core mechanisms interact, must
be thoroughly comprehended (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Boden, 2004;
Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004; Fuchs, Kumar, & Porter, 2007; Lubart & Getz, 1997;
Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2005; Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2007). For example,
Puccio et al.’s (2007) latest revision of the Creative Problem-Solving (CPS) framework,
The Thinking Skills Model, has deliberately included a set of affective skills that go hand
in hand with each of the thinking skills deployed when engaged in CPS.
With the advent and hype of emotional intelligence theory (Goleman, 1995;
Salovey & Mayer, 1990) many researchers’ efforts have been channeled to better
understand the nature of emotion and its influences in individuals’ interpersonal skills,
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leadership, and creative behavior. Consequently, evidence from a more recent body of
research has expanded the breadth of influence of emotion in creativity. For example, in
the domain of creative personality, research on emotional creativity (EC) (Averill, 1999;
Fuchs et al., 2007; Ivcevich, Brackett, & Mayer, 2007) has yielded strong correlations
between EC and creative performance (Dollinger, Urban & James, 2004; Fuchs et al.,
2007; McCrae, 1987). In the domain of organizational psychology, positive correlations
have been established between emotional intelligence (EI) and creative leadership
(Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2001; Puccio et al., 2007; Zhou & George, 2003).
Despite the above progress in understanding the influence of emotion in
creativity, efforts at assessing the influence of emotion at the very core of the creative
process are still scarce (Amabile et al., 2005; Isen, 1999; Russ & Schafer, 2006). It
should come as no surprise that tampering with an individual’s emotions is a delicate
issue that imposes substantial ethical and experimental limitations to the empirical
assessment of emotions. Consequently, the current state in this area of inquiry has
remained mostly in the theoretical arena (Boden, 2004; Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004;
Lubart & Getz, 1997; Puccio et al., 2005) and besides the recent efforts of Amabile et al.
(2005) and Russ and Schafer (2006), there has been no thread of continuous research
efforts to probe deeper into the ways in which emotions modulate the creative process.

Rationale, Research Question and Hypotheses
Among the available theories regarding the role of emotion in the creative
process, one that was germane to this research study was Lubart and Getz’s (1997)
emotional resonance mechanism theory. This theory stated that as an individual
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experiences both external and internal stimuli, he/she tags each processed and recorded
stimuli in his/her brain with an emotional valance (value). Subsequently, in the process of
retrieving these stimuli for cognitive processing, the emotional valance of the stimuli is
both activated and propagated throughout the brain, in what Lubart and Getz (1997)
termed as the emotional resonance mechanism. This emotional resonance mechanism
allows distant and remote concepts that share a similar emotional tone and/or valance to
be brought to awareness and proximity and therefore, enhancing the probability that these
are manipulated in conjunction to spur novel concepts and ideas. In this way, creative
combinations might emerge from two or more totally remote concepts that share
absolutely no logical relationship at all.
Building on the idea that there might be a mechanism operating in the brain as
described by Lubart and Getz (1997), the purpose of this research study was to contribute
to the notion that emotion indeed has an influence in creative production beyond
motivation and creative drive, by modulating directly the process of generating novel and
useful combinations. Furthermore, if associations driven by emotions yield ideas,
concepts and/or products judged as more creative than the output of cognitive-factual
driven associations, this would demand complementing current creativity facilitation
frameworks too narrowly focused on provoking rational cognitive shifts, with a deliberate
use of emotion as a springboard for generating novel and useful ideas.
Given the above rationale, the primary research question proposed for this
research study was:
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Will individuals exposed to an emotional priming stimulus (before engaging in a creative
task) exhibit higher degrees of creativity than individuals exposed to either a rationalfactual priming stimulus or no stimuli at all?
The underlying assumption behind this research question was that the exposure to
an emotional priming stimulus should activate an individual’s emotional resonance
mechanism. In doing so, the individual would start working with his or her emotions,
either consciously or unconsciously, to seek novel patterns to be applied in completing
the experimental creative task.
Given the above research question, the following hypotheses are presented:
Hypothesis #1: H1 = CLEP > CLFP > CLNP
Creativity Level = CL
No Priming = NP
Factual Priming = FP
Emotional Priming = EP
The above hypothesis is interpreted as follows:
The expected level of creativity (as rated by domain experts) of an individual’s
artistic work who is exposed to an emotional priming stimulus during the creative
process should be significantly higher than the expected level of creativity of an
individual’s artistic work who is exposed to a factual priming stimulus during the
creative process or to no priming stimuli at all. Consequently, the expected level
of creativity (as rated by domain experts) of an individual’s artistic work who is
exposed to a factual priming stimulus during the creative process should be
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significantly higher than the level of expected creativity of an individual’s artistic
work who is exposed to no priming stimulus at all.
Hypothesis #2: Under the premise of an emotional resonance mechanism in operation,
individuals exposed to an emotional priming stimulus should report higher degrees of
engagement in creative and/or unconventional thinking than individuals who are exposed
to a factual priming stimulus or no stimulus at all.
Hypothesis #3: Under the premise of an emotional resonance mechanism in operation,
individuals exposed to an emotional priming stimulus should report a greater tendency to
tap deliberately into their emotions and feelings during their creative process than
individuals who are exposed to a factual priming stimulus or no stimulus at all.

Chapter Summary
Emotion and the affective components of creativity has been an elusive area of
scientific study. Nonetheless, researchers studying the creative phenomenon from varied
fields of study (e.g. cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience) have
converged to the fact that it is impossible to fully grasp the blueprint of creativity without
understanding the scope of influence, role and interplay between emotion and creative
cognition. Efforts in understanding emotion as an intervening variable at the core of the
creative process, meaning the way that emotion intervenes in the process of forming new
and useful combination, have been mostly theoretical. In light of the above gap, this
research study was an attempt to cast empirical evidence in favor of the effect of using
emotions as an intervening factor in the process of creating new and useful combinations,
patterns, concepts and/or idea.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the body of research and literature that
has examined the relationship between emotions and the creative process. In order to
fully comprehend the above-mentioned relationship, a broader view will be offered to
give the reader a systemic approach to the interaction between these two variables. Thus,
literature regarding the creative personality and the environment that fosters creativity,
and their respective links to emotions, will also be covered. In addition, key concepts and
definitions will be provided with regard to creativity, the creative process, emotions and
cognition in order to ensure a thorough and clear understanding of the body of literature
and research presented in this chapter.

Key Concepts and Definitions
What is Creativity?
Definitions, models and theories of creativity are abundant in the field of creative
studies (Davis, 2004; Mumford, 2003; Runco, 2007; Sternberg, 1999). Rhodes (1961)
provided a meta-framework that allowed for the classifying of these definitions, theories
and models into the four P’s taxonomy: (a) the creative person; (b) the creative process;
(c) creative product(s); and (d) the creative press (understood as the environment that
fosters creativity). Simonton (1988) advocated including a fifth “P”, that stands for
persuasion, emphasizing the role of the individual to push for social acceptance of his
creation. In addition, Runco (2003) lobbied for a sixth “P” that stands for potential, in an
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attempt to recognize individuals who have creative potential, but who lack the skills to
express such creativity. Given the four P’s framework, Murdock and Puccio (1993)
suggested the adoption of an ecological approach to creativity by studying creative
behavior as an interaction of the four P's. One contemporary creativity model that has
captured this systemic approach is Woodman and Schoenfeldt’s (1990) interactionist
model of creative behavior in organizational contexts. In this model, creative behavior
would be modulated by an individual’s personality, cognitive style, contextual influence,
social influences, and overall anteceding conditions. The systemic nature of the creative
phenomenon makes creativity a complex multifaceted construct (Guilford, 1967;
Mackinnon, 1978; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Stein, 1974; Torrance, 1979). The fact
that creativity is a systemic, complex, and multifaceted phenomenon makes the scientific
study of creativity a tough endeavor. First, there are limitations to the ecological validity
of the instruments used to capture any given dimension of creativity (e.g, divergent
thinking, incubation, problem definition, personality traits, environmental factors, etc.).
Second, it is almost impossible to get an ecological assessment that fully captures the
systemic interactions that modulate creative production and/or creative behavior
(Murdock & Puccio, 1999).
Among creativity scholars, there is consensus that for something to be creative, it
must meet two qualitative criterions: (a) a degree of novelty, newness, and/or originality
and (b) a level of appropriateness, value, and/or usefulness (Davis, 2004; Lubart, 2001;
Runco, 2007). Hence a widely accepted definition of creativity is the production of
ideas, concepts and/or products that are both novel and useful (Amabile, 1988; Boden,
1998; Stein, 1974). The word product is used in its broadest sense, and may include ideas
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concepts, behaviors, relationships, systems and both tangible and intangible products and
services. MacKinnon (1978) viewed the creative product as a reflection (and a
converging point) of the interacting forces of the creative personality, creative process
and the environment. Accordingly, in Mackinnon’s view the best way to study creativity
is to start by examining the creative products of individuals. Although the definition of
creativity as the production of novel and useful ideas is appropriate for describing
creativity in wide range of contexts, there are other definitions in the literature that better
capture the nature of the creative personality, creative process, and creative environment.
For example, Ackoff and Vergara (1988) regarded creativity as the ability to overcome
self-imposed constraints. This is a personality definition within the Third Force
Psychology family of creativity theories (Treffinger, Isaksen, & Firestien, 1983), such as
Maslow (1968, 1970) and Rogers’ (1959,1961) self-actualization theory. Understanding
that there are numerous definitions and theories available in the literature, creativity as
the production of novel and useful ideas will be adopted for the practical implications it
has for experimental research design. Furthermore, in the present study’s research design
(described in detail in Chapter Three of the present volume) it was the creative product
that was used to assess differences in creativity level among participants.
In terms of the creative process, more than advocating for a specific model, the
emphasis of this research has to do with its associative nature. Several creativity scholars
have stressed the importance of associative processes as fundamental processes to
creativity (Boden, 1998; Davis, 2004; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Gordon, 1961;
Koestler, 1964; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Mednick, 1962; Runco, 2007; Simonton, 1988;
Weisberg, 1995). However, for creativity to crystallize into an idea that is both novel and
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useful, there are numerous mental operations and thinking skills (Lubart, 2001; Puccio,
Murdock, & Mance, 2007) besides the associative components of cognition, which are
necessary for such outcome (e.g. categorization, sorting, synthesizing, evaluation, etc.).
Considering the above, and without undermining the role of other processes necessary for
creativity, the main focus of this research study is to assess the power of emotions as a
mechanism for crafting associations (Lubart & Getz, 1997) that are conducive to the
production of ideas, concepts, and products that are both novel and useful.

What is Emotion?
Just as there is no “one” inclusive definition of creativity, the same holds true
with regard to a definition of emotions. Levine (2007) argued that in the scientific
literature, concepts of emotion, affect, and mood are widely used and interchanged. In
clinical terminology, emotion describes what a person is feeling at a given moment and
context. On the other hand, affect has to do more with an outward expression of an
emotional state (Levine, 2007). Lastly, mood tends to be used for a pervasive emotional
state that perpetuates itself for longer periods of time (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Salovey
and Mayer (1990) defined emotion as a response to meaningful stimuli, whose source
might be either internal or external. Meaningful refers to the stimuli’s emotional valence,
which is the significance an individual assigns to the stimuli while it is experienced and
then subsequently encoded in our memory. In addition, emotional responses are adaptive.
Any individual has the ability to regulate his emotional responses in order to catalyze
personal transformation and better social fitness (Goleman, 1995; Mayer & Salovey,
1997).
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LeDoux (1989; 1996) offered a biological perspective to the definition of emotion
that is worth exploring for the purpose of this research study. He differentiated emotion
from the concept of feelings. In his view, emotions are biological and physiological
responses, triggered by either internal or external stimuli. These responses are most of the
time unconscious to the individual. He affirmed that there are commonalities with regard
to emotional reactions, both neurological and phenomenological, between humans and
other species. Many emotional responses have been kept by evolution because they serve
as a mechanism for the preservation of the species. For example, the fear emotional
mechanism generates corresponding physiological responses such as adrenaline rush,
muscle tension, and freezing that allows human beings (and animals) to better cope with
dangerous situations (LeDoux, 1996). On the other hand, feelings are the product of the
conscious appraisal of an emotional state and its representation in working memory. In
other words, feelings are the product of an individual’s awareness of his/her emotional
reaction (LeDoux, 1996). LeDoux was explicit in the fact that the emotional reaction and
cognitive appraisal mechanism work as a closed feedback loop. Duncan and Barret
(2007) stressed this interplay a step further, by declaring that there is no distinction at all
between emotions and cognition. Emotional memories might be encoded both
consciously (the product of conscious cognitive appraisal) and unconsciously (those
related to the physiological reactions elicited by emotional reactions). Given the above
biological framework, the awareness and emotional memories that we often describe as
feelings are only possible with the conscious cognitive appraisal of an emotional state
(Duncan & Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1996; Stein, 2007). Whether the neural correlates of
emotions are indeed distinct from those of general cognition is still in debate (Duncan &
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Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1996), yet it is only through the conscious cognitive appraisal
mechanism that we become aware of emotions in the form of feelings (LeDoux, 1996;
Stein, 2007).
Lubart and Getz (1997) offered a descriptive framework that helps to crystallize a
definition of emotions. They distinguished between biological, social and psychological
factors modulating different emotions. Depending on the influence of these three
variables on a particular response, it will determine the degree of complexity of the
emotional experience. Consequently, and in line with LeDoux (1996), they recognized
fear as a primitive biologically based emotional state. On the other hand, happiness and
love are deemed to be more complex emotions modulated by psychological and social
factors (Lubart & Getz, 1997). The inclusion of a psychological factor makes these
complex emotional responses quite idiosyncratic and subjective in nature. Lubart and
Getz regarded the latter as affective experiences or feelings. Note that this fits LeDoux’s
(1996) definition of feelings as the conscious cognitive appraisal of emotions. This could
be interpreted as the conscious modulation of the emotional response by the myriad of
psychological traits and memories of each individual. Here after, and for the purpose of
this research study, emotion will be regarded as the conscious cognitive appraisal
(feelings) of an elicited emotional state, with its corresponding physiological reactions
and flow of memories triggered, as a part of the appraisal process. Note that at times, and
according to the different pieces of literature under review, emotions will be addressed as
either emotions or affects and therefore, either emotional states or affective states
respectively.
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What is Cognition?
Neisser (1967) defined cognition as the mental process by which stimuli input is
transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. According to LeDoux
(1989), cognition would refer simply to brain computation processes. Note that both
definitions are neutral with regard to content and therefore, the brain can process both
factual computations and/or affective computations. Another view extracted from the
field of cybernetics is that cognition is a human trait linked to information processing that
happens in the mind (Hollangel, 2002). Based on the above definitions, cognition will be
regarded as the mental processes by which individuals manipulate information of diverse
nature such as external, internal, factual, and/or affective information.

The Role of Emotion in Creativity under the Four P’s Framework
The following pages will offer a review of the relationship between emotions and
creativity using Rhodes’ (1961) four P’s creativity framework: (a) person (ality); (b)
process; (c) product; and (d) press (environment). Although each dimension will be
reviewed independently, the ecological view on creativity (Murdock & Puccio, 1993)
must be kept in mind at all times. In addition, and in line with MacKinnon’s (1978)
perspective that the creative product is the result of the interacting forces between the
creative personality, creative process and creative environment, the intervening role of
emotions in creativity will only be discussed in terms of the creative personality, the
creative environment, and the creative process. The creative product will be regarded as a
dependant variable from the other three P’s.
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Emotion and the Creative Personality
Personality is understood as patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that
determine our individuality and are stable, both across different contexts and in time
(Phares, 1986). By stating that personality is a relatively stable construct, it does not
impede an individual from changing and modifying aspects of his personality in the long
term. Accordingly, the creative personality would encompass a set of traits that are
potentially conducive to creative behavior and that meet the above criteria. In this line of
thought, the seminal work of the IPAR studies (MacKinnon, 1963; 1965) and the creation
of the Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) are the foundations of the body of
theory and research around the creative personality. Maslow (1968, 1970) and Rogers
(1959,1961), pioneers of the humanistic strand of psychology, offered complementary
insights to the study of the creative personality. Whereas most researchers of the creative
personality focused their attention on acts of genius, Maslow and Rogers focused their
attention to ordinary everyday life creativity. In this context, they proposed that
individuals who behaved creatively in everyday life were highly self-actualized
individuals. Self-actualization, as regarded by Maslow and Rogers, was an individual’s
optimal condition for growth, self-fulfillment and happiness. Davis (2004) offered a list
of traits of the self-actualized man that remarkably overlaps with those traits of the
creative persona. For example, the self-actualized man was described by Davis (2004) as
an individual tolerant to ambiguity, with a sense of humor, autonomous, who experiences
moments if peak performance, intrinsically motivated, and with an original and inventive
way at looking at life.
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Barron and Harrington (1981) offered the following synthesis of the creative
personality’s core traits:
The empirical work of the past 15 years on the personality characteristics of
creative people brought a few surprises. In general, a fairly stable set of core
characteristics (e.g. high valuation of esthetic qualities in experience, broad
interests attraction to complexity, high energy, independence of judgment,
autonomy, intuition, self-confidence, ability to resolve antinomies or to
accommodate apparently opposite or conflicting traits in one’s self-concept, and,
finally, a firm sense of self as “creative”) continued to emerge as correlates of
creative achievement and activity in many domains. (p. 453)
Costa and McCrae (1985) regarded the pool of traits described above to fit a
broad domain of personality labeled openness to experience. Accordingly, one of the
foundations of Roger’s (1961) theory of creativity is the need of openness to experience
as mechanism for creative growth and self-actualization. One of most respected and used
models of personality is the NEO-PI (Five Factor model) developed by Costa and
McCrae (1985). In turn, openness to experience is one of the five personality scales
within the NEO-PI model. According to McCrae (1987), the openness to experience scale
involves sensitivity to fantasy, aesthetics, ideas, action, and values. The NEO-PI has been
used in different creative personality studies (Dollinger, Urban, & James, 2004; McCrae,
1987). In a longitudinal study on 268 individuals ranging from 18 to 80 years, McCrae
(1987) reported correlations between six tests of divergent thinking, the NEO-PI model,
and a 30-item Creative Personality Scale (CPS) (Gough, 1979). The correlations between
the openness to experience scale and the scores of five out of the six divergent thinking
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tests were all positive, ranging from values of .18 to .41 (most of them at levels of
significance of p < .001). Given the fact that this was a longitudinal study that spanned
over 13 years, McCrae regarded the above pattern of correlations to be remarkable,
especially when considering that there were differences in the time and methodology with
which the data was recorded. The correlation between the CPS scores and the openness to
experience scale ranged from .26 to .61 (most correlations at levels of significance of p <
.001). Although Barron and Harrington (1981) acknowledged that differences in
creativity domain might lead to variability in personality traits, McCrae (1987) regarded
openness to experience to be a common characteristic of creative individuals. Dollinger
et al. (2004) used a sample of 151 university students to test correlations between the
scores from the Test of Creative Thinking-Drawing Production (TCT-DP), the Thematic
Apperception Test (TAT), scores from the Creative Personality Scale (CPS) (Gough,
1979) and the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1985), in order to validate the use of the TCTDP and TAT as creativity product measures. The NEO-PI’s openness to experience scale
correlated positively with both creativity measures TCT-DP and TAT, at values of .36 (p
< .001) and .27 (p < .05) respectively. Although the focus of their research was validating
the two creative product measures mentioned above, their results supported McCrae’s
(1987) established relationship between openness to experience and scores of creative
production. In addition, the openness to experience scale correlated positively at levels of
.55 (p < .001) with the CPS scale scores replicating McCrae’s results.
Given the above findings, openness to experience (as measured by the NEO-PI)
emerges as a consistent creativity personality trait. Although variability on personality
traits should be expected across different creativity domains, openness to experience

Review of Literature

18

might be regarded as a general creativity personality trait. The relationship between
emotion and the openness to experience trait (and in turn to the creative persona) comes
through the construct of Emotional Creativity (EC).
Averill (1999) coined the concept of Emotional Creativity (EC), defined as the
generation, expression and use of novel and useful emotions. He advocated that the same
relationship that has been established between intelligence and creativity, that of a
threshold theory (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Davis, 2004; Runco, 2007), is also valid
for the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey
& Mayer, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1995) and emotional creativity. For an emotional
response to be considered creative, it must meet three criteria: (a) novelty (with regard to
the individual’s past behavior); (b) effectiveness (must be of potential benefit to the
individual or group); and (c) authenticity (reflects the individual’s own values and
beliefs) (Averill, 1999). According to Averill, there are different levels of EC responses.
The lowest level would demand an emotional response that is only effective to cope with
a given situation. A higher level would demand modifying an emotional response to
better serve the need of the individual or the group. In its maximum expression, a highly
creative emotional response would demand developing a totally new emotional form
based on a change in belief and the rules by which emotions are constituted (Averill,
1999). For example, when an individual is in conflict with a close friend, an emotional
creative response would entail transforming conflicting emotions (beyond coping) and
behaving in a new and constructive way that results in a stronger friendship (Fuchs,
Kumar & Porter, 2007).
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Averill created the Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI) in order to measure
levels of EC. The ECI is composed of three subscales derived from the criteria mentioned
above: (a) preparedness (knowledge about one’s emotion); (b) novelty; and (c)
effectiveness/authenticity (for the psychometric properties of the ECI, see Averill, 1999).
Interestingly, in a study that included 149 psychology undergraduate students, Averill
reported correlations of the ECI scores and the NEO-PI that suggested a strong overlap
between the ECI and the openness to experience scale (r = .58, p <.001). In Averill’s
(1999) words, “The overlap is most evident with respect to the novelty of the experience,
and somewhat less so for the effectiveness/authenticity” (p. 349). In a more recent
research, Fuchs et al. (2007) reported studies that showed positive and significant
correlations between the ECI and creative personality measures such as the Self
Perceived Creativity Test, Creative Activities and Interests and the CPS (Gough, 1979).
The purpose of Fuchs et al.’s study was to find correlations between EC, alexthymia
(difficulty in expressing one’s feelings) and styles of creativity. For this purpose, they
administered a battery of psychometric instruments including the ECI, the Self Perceived
Creative Capacity Scale (SPCC) plus seven subscales of styles of creativity in every day
life, the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI: a measure of fantasy
proneness) and the BVAQ-20B (a measure to assess level of alexthymia) to a sample of
322 students. Fuchs et al. (2007) found that the correlations between ECI total scale and
its subscales (novelty, preparedness and effectiveness/authenticity), the SPCC, and ICMI
suggested an overlapping of constructs. A confirmatory factor analysis revealed a single
factor that accounted for 42.21% of the total variance. The factor was interpreted as a
general creative capacity factor, comprising both fantasy and emotional aspects of
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creativity (Fuchs et al., 2007). This results are in line with Averill’s (1999) assertion that
cognitive (rational) creative is hardly distinguishable from emotional creativity due to the
tight interplay of emotions (in social o individual contexts) and rational cognition in
everyday life. Ivcevich, Brackett, and Mayer (2007) conducted two empirical studies that
suggested that emotional creativity and cognitive creativity could indeed be separated.
Their results from confirmatory factor analysis yielded distinct factors for cognitive
creativity and emotional creativity.
Ivcevic et al. (2007) studies yielded additional degrees of evidence in support of
EC as a predictor of creative potential. In Study 1, Averill’s (1999) ECI correlated
positively and significantly with two cognitive creativity tests, the Remote Associate Test
(RAT) and Consequences test (derived from the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking)
with values of r =.22, p < .05 and r =.27, p < .05, respectively. A similar pattern of
correlations was reported from Study 2. In addition to the above-mentioned creativity
measures, Study 1 included a poem writing creativity task and Study 2 included a selfcreativity report measure. The correlations reported between the poem writing scores and
the ECI scores (total and subscales) were at levels of .30 (p <.01) except for the ECI’s
effectiveness scale. In regard to the self-report creativity measure used in Study 2, the
ECI’s total scale score correlated positively at a level of .26 (p < .01). The above results
favor EC as a predictor of creative behavior. In addition, Ivcevic et al.’s (2007) studies
replicated Averill’s (1999) pattern of correlations between the NEO-PI’s openness to
experience scale and the ECI. They suggested that there might be an overlapping of both
instruments as the NEO-PI’s openness to experience scale includes a facet scale of
openness to feelings.
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In light of the above-described relationship between emotional creativity and the
creative persona, one would expect that there should be some relationship between the
close yet distinct construct of emotional intelligence (EI) and the creative persona.
Salovey and Mayer (1990) defined EI as, “ the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide
one’s thinking and actions”(p. 189). Hence, EI is the intersection between the cognitive
and emotional aspects of an individual’s personality (Salovey & Mayer, 1995). In the
above statement, the term cognitive involves applying a criterion of intelligence to the
appraisal of the emotional state. Therefore, the individual is not just conscious of his
emotional state, but he evaluates whether it is appropriate or not for a given situation
(Salovey & Mayer, 1995). Salovey and Mayer (1990) related EI to Gardner’s (1983)
multiple intelligence theory, in particular, with the social intelligence category. EI theory
involves the following areas of influence over emotion: (a) the ability to perceive
emotions accurately; (b) use emotions to enhance one’s thinking; (c) understand and label
emotions; and (d) regulate emotions in self and others (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). In terms
EI regulation of emotions, a sustained positive mood might influence an individual’s
organization and use of memory in creative problem solving tasks and enhance overall
creative performance (Isen, 1999; Ivcevich et al., 2007; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). The
influence of moods in the creative problem solving process will be explored further along
within this chapter in the section pertaining the review of emotion and the creative
process.
From a research standpoint, the body of research that correlates EI to the creative
personality and creative performance is scarce. Ivcevic et al’s (2007) empirical studies
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(mentioned earlier in the context of EC) tested the direct relationship between EI (using
the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test [MSCEIT]) with cognitive
intelligence (SAT scores), with cognitive creativity through the use of the Remote
Associate Test (RAT) and Consequences test (derived from the Torrance Test of Creative
Thinking), with the personality test (NEO-PI) and the poem creative task. Ivcevic et al.’s
studies revealed that EI correlated with cognitive intelligence (SAT scores) moderately
(Study 1 r = .34, p < .001 and Study 2 r = .30, p <.01). This findings supported the notion
that EI is a distinct construct, yet a subset of general intelligence. The pattern of
correlations between EI and cognitive creativity were non significant (except for one
value in Study 2). With regard to correlations with the NEO-PI, none of EI’s total scores
and its subscales correlated significantly with the scale of openness to experience
(However, there were other significant correlations; For example, EI’s regulation of
emotion subscale correlated positively and significantly with the NEO-PI’s extraversion,
agreeableness and conscientiousness scales [r = .19, p <.05; r = .28, p <.01; and r = .19, p
<.05 respectively]). Moreover, the EI scores did not correlate with the poem-writing task
used in Study 1, nor the creativity self-report measure used in Study 2. The above results
leads to the interpretation that EI has no relationship either with the creative personality
(through the openness to experience link) or as a predictor of creative behavior. However,
Ivcevic et al. (2007) hypothesized that the EI might serve as regulator between emotional
traits and creativity, particularly in individuals with high mood swings. In addition, there
is a direct link between EI and leadership (Zhou & George, 2003), and the latter with the
modulation of creativity in organizational settings (Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2007;
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Zhou & George, 2003). This relationship will be further explored in the next section of
this chapter.
Summarizing the above arguments, openness to experience seems to emerge as
general trait of the creative personality. Evidence from past research efforts suggested
that openness to experience as captured by the NEO-PI might be a sound predictor of
creative potential. The relationship of emotions with the creative personality comes from
the evidence and close relationship (somehow overlapping) between emotional creativity
and openness to experience. In this line of thought, the ECI has exhibited good predictive
capabilities of creative behavior as reported by Averill (1999), Fuchs et al. (2007) and
Ivcevic et al. (2007). An emotional creative individual should be capable of transforming
his emotional states into novel and effective emotional responses that serve as a catalyst
for creative behavior. Although research doesn’t support a significant relationship
between EI and openness to experience and/or creative production tests, Ivcevich et al.
(2007) suggested that EI might serve as a regulation mechanism for creative individuals
prone to high mood swings. In addition, there is a considerable body of literature that has
linked EI to leadership (Brown, Bryant, & Reilly, 2006; Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey,
2002; Dulewicz, Young, & Dulewicz, 2005) Leadership in turn has been related to
creative performance in organizational settings (Ekvall, 1996, 1999; Puccio et al., 2007;
Zhou & George, 2003). Therefore, emotional intelligent leaders regulate their emotional
responses to the situational context (these responses might not be creative per se) setting
the appropriate climate for the creative expression of others (Goleman, Boyatzis, &
McKee, 2001; Zhou & George, 2003). The interaction of emotion and the climate that is
conducive to creativity will be explored in detail in the next section of this chapter.
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Emotion and the Creative Environment
With regard to the broad area of environment, the field of creativity has mainly
focused its research in the strand of organizational climate. Researchers have allocated
their efforts in identifying the variables within the organizational climate that are
conducive to creative performance (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Herron, & Lazenby, 1996;
Ekvall, 1996, 1999; Isaksen & Lauer, 2002). Organizational climate is understood as a
conglomerate of behaviors, attitudes and feelings that characterize life in an organization
(Ekvall, 1996, 1999). Ekvall (1996) regarded climate to be an independent construct of
people’s perceptions, hence something intrinsic and embedded within the organization.
However, individuals indeed have a perception of the organizational climate, and in turn,
these perceptions translate into a psychological climate. The psychological climate is
understood as the perception of attitudes, feelings and behaviors that characterize
organizational everyday life (Puccio et al., 2007). In this same vein of thought, Amabile
et al. (1996) referred to the psychological context of creativity, as the sum of individual
perceptions of the work environment that modulate creative behavior. The metaphor of
climate has been used to portray the dynamic and changing nature of the organizational
climate. Therefore, in the same way weather shifts in location and time, so does
organizational climate vary in location and time. These variations will have an effect on
individual’s attitudes, moods and behaviors towards organizational and creative
performance (Puccio et al., 2007). It is important to distinguish the concept of
organizational climate to that of organizational culture, the latter being a more permanent
and deeply grounded set of values, beliefs, history and traditions that are less susceptible
to variations (Ekvall, 1996; Isaksen & Lauer, 2002; Puccio et al., 2007). With regard to
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the climate that fosters creativity, research has shown high degrees of evidence that the
climate is indeed an intervening variable in creative performance (and overall
organizational performance). Thus, a set of dimensions that either favor or impede
creativity have been identified and documented in the creativity literature (Amabile et al.
1996; Ekvall, 1996, 1999; Einarsen & Mathisen, 2004; Isaksen & Lauer, 2002; Lauer,
1994; Puccio et al., 2007). Among the dimensions identified in the literature that
facilitate creative behavior, a few of them are: (a) challenge; (b) freedom; (c) idea
support; (d) trust and openness; (e) dynamism and liveliness; (f) playfulness and humor;
and (g) risk taking to name a few (Ekvall, 1996; Puccio et al., 2007). Among those
dimensions that hinder creative behavior we find: (a) conflict (Ekvall, 1996); (b)
workload pressure; and (c) organizational impediments (Amabile et al., 1996).
As already mentioned at the end of the previous section, the creativity literature
suggests that there is a strong link between leadership and creativity (Puccio et al., 2007;
Runco, 2007), and of particular relevance for this section, between leadership style and
the creative climate. In regard to latter, Ekvall (1996) stated that, “The conclusion should
be that the climate to a fairly large extent is in the hands of the manager.” (p. 122).
Furthermore, Puccio et al. (2007) reported that leadership style might explain between
52% and 70% of employee’s perception of a particular organizational climate, and
whether or not the latter is conducive to creative performance. The leadership style that
fosters creativity is analogous to the transformational leadership style, the latter
characterized by: (a) being open to change; (b) encouraging new ideas; (c) encouraging
debate; and (d) encouraging risk taking and failure (Puccio et al., 2007).
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Interestingly, the transformational leadership pattern of behavior described above,
overlaps with Goleman et al.’s (2001) description of the emotional intelligent leader.
Accordingly, the EI leader is described as an individual who creates work environments
characterized by trust, collaboration, healthy risk taking and learning. Note the
resemblance of the work environments’ characteristics described above, with those of the
creative climate that fosters creativity (Amabile et al. 1996; Ekvall, 1996, 1999; Isaksen
& Lauer, 2002). In addition, transformational leadership theories are unique in terms of
the emphasis on emotional and empathic components of leadership (Bono, Foldes,
Vinson, & Muros, 2007). Goleman et al. (2001) emphasized the importance of leaders’
management and regulation of moods as a crucial factor driving employee performance.
Hence, EI leaders can assess their emotional state through emotional self-awareness,
authentically regulate and modify their emotional responses through self management,
understand their impact through empathy, and ultimately, deploy behaviors that will
positively boost other’s affective states and performance (Goleman et al., 2001). A study
carried out by Bono et al. (2007) in regard to 57 individuals working in a health care
company, yielded evidence in favor of transformational leadership behavior as an
intervening variable in employee’s emotional states and perception of job satisfaction.
Thus, individuals who worked for supervisors rated high on transformational leadership
reported having more episodes of positive emotions than individuals who worked for
low-level transformational leadership supervisors (Bono et al., 2007). In addition,
transformational leadership served as a buffer between non-authentic emotional
regulation (faking positive emotions and hiding negative emotions) and decreased job
satisfaction. Bono et al. (2007) synthesized their findings as follows:
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Our results suggest that managers’ transformational leadership behaviors may
have broad, deep, and long-lasting effects on individual employees and the
organization as a whole. Beyond their immediate effects on employee mood, the
positive emotions elicited by transformational leaders have the potential to
influence the overall work climate and customer satisfaction. (p. 1364)
At this point it is worth noting that the psychological climate was defined as the
perception of attitude, behaviors and feelings that characterize the organizational day-today experience. Therefore, leaders have the capacity to catalyze the perception of a
positive climate through genuine positive emotions. Consequently, the perception of a
positive climate will contribute to generate a climate of trust, playfulness and openness,
all of which are dimensions of the climate that fosters creative behavior. With regard to
the relationship between transformational leadership and emotional intelligence (EI),
though there is a theoretical fit (Goleman et al., 2001), the experimental evidence of a
direct relationship is still elusive (Brown et al., 2006; Duckett & Macfarlane, 2003;
Dulewicz et al., 2005). Nonetheless, the fact that the relationship hasn’t been established
experimentally doesn’t imply that this relationship between EI and transformational
leadership doesn’t exist in reality (Brown et al., 2003). In line with Goleman et al.’s
(2001) view, Zhou and George (2003) stated that in an organizational setting, it is
precisely the EI leader’s behaviors that are determinant in awakening and supporting
employee creative behavior. Zhou and George (2003) argued that whatever the stage of
the creative process (they described a process similar to Treffinger, Isaksen, & Dorval,
1994, Creative Problem Solving model), individuals and groups might easily engage in
maladaptive behaviors that hinder creative performance. Some of these behaviors are
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related to expressions of anxiety, conflict, frustration, confrontation, morale decay and
overexcitement. With regard to the triggers underlying these behaviors, Zhou and George
(2003) emphasized the ambiguity that often characterizes creative endeavors (departing
from what is known), the fear of failure, fatigue on long-term projects, differences in
problem solving styles among team members, and attribution of creative work credit.
Therefore, an EI leader should be capable of channeling constructively his/hers and
others’ emotions to serve the creative process and in turn, create a climate that is
supportive to healthy emotional-behavioral expression (Zhou & George, 2003). The latter
resonates with Amabile et al.’s (1996) stimulants scales to creativity supervisory
encouragement and work group support and also, with Ekvall’s (1996,1991) dimensions
of idea support, trust and openness, and debate. Prince (2003) reported case studies in
which the above kind of leadership style resulted in favorable organizational climates that
led to corporate success. In addition, he reported his empirical observations derived from
Synectics (Gordon, 1961; Gordon & Poze, 1981; Prince, 1967) sessions in corporate
problem solving scenarios and the impact that negative discounting emotional behaviors
had in the climate conducive to creativity (referred to as field). He reported that
individuals who felt being negatively discounted by their peers during the sessions,
immediately (and often unconsciously) engaged in defensive maneuvers and behaviors.
These behaviors tended to be adversarial to the “offender” regardless if such behaviors
were destructive to organizational purposes. The net impact of these dynamics was
reflected in a negative field and the Synectics group performance declined (Prince, 2003).
Thus, he emphasized that as emotional beings, individuals need to be aware that
behaviors and communication patterns are emotionally charged and the latter, susceptible
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to subjective interpretations and reactions that will have an impact over climate. Lastly,
Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, and Staw (2005) stated that organizations are affective laden
environments. In their view, creativity is an affectively charged event (Zhou & George,
2003) in which complex cognitive processes co-occur with (and shape) emotional
experiences and vice versa. In their research study in organizational setting, they found
that there was a positive and linear relationship between an individual’s creative
engagement and states of positive mood. In addition, they also found evidence that the
style and tone of peer and/or supervisor feedback could either initiate a virtuous or
vicious creative cycle. This resonates again with the dimensions of the creative climate
that fosters or impedes creativity (Amabile et al., 1996; Ekvall, 1996, 1999) and the
importance of leadership (Puccio et al., 2007; Zhou & George, 2003) in setting the
climate that is conducive to creative behavior.
In recapitulation of the above arguments, creativity research has mainly focused
in the sphere of organizational climate, and in particular, in identifying those variables in
the climate that either facilitate or hinder creative performance (Amabile, 1996; Ekvall,
1996). Research in the creative climate has revealed a strong relationship between the
climate that is conducive to creativity and the transformational leadership style (Puccio et
al., 2007). This leadership style is unique in terms of the emphasis on emotional and
empathic components of leadership (Bono et al. 2007). In addition, there are theoretical
parallels between transformational leadership and the emotional intelligent leaders
(Goleman et al., 2001). Bono et al.’s (2007) research stressed the fact that
transformational leadership influenced individual’s positive moods. Amabile et al.’s
(2005) suggested a linear relationship between positive mood and creative performance
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in organizational settings. Given the fact that the creative process is an emotionally
charged event (Amabile et al., 2005; Zhou & George, 2003), Zhou and George stated that
it is through the leader’s emotional intelligence skills that creativity is ignited, modulated
and effectively sustained in an organization. Finally, Prince (2003) offered case studies
that supported the fact that effective modulation of emotional-behavior leads to a climate
conducive to creativity and that when negatively emotional driven behaviors are not
controlled, the climate becomes disrupted and creative performance declines.

Emotion and the Creative Process
Wallas’ (1926) four-stage model of the creative process, which included the
stages of preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification, was one of the first
attempts to model the creative process. In addition, many historical creative
breakthroughs, as reported in biographies and autobiographies of creative eminent
individuals, have been described using this model (Davis, 2004; Lubart, 2001; Runco,
2007). However, this model says little or nothing about what are the mental processes at
work at each of its stages (Lubart, 2001). In his presidential address to the American
Psychological Association, Guilford (1950) manifested his discomfort with the four-stage
model regarding the lack of details about the cognitive processes essential to creative
thought. Thus, he made a deliberate call for more research geared towards unveiling these
underlying cognitive mechanisms. Since then, there has been an ongoing quest in the
field of creative studies to indentify and model the stages, sequences, processes, and subprocess that underlie creative thought (and if these are distinct from those of ordinary
thought). Among some of these models of the creative process are Gordon’s (1961)
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Synectics model, Mednick’s (1962) associative theory of creative thought, Koestler’s
(1964) bisociation model, Guilford’s (1967) Structure of the Intellect, Torrance’s (1988)
scientific method approach, Simonton’s (1988) chance configuration theory, Woodman
and Schoenfeldt’s (1990) interactionist model of creative behavior, Finke et al.’s (1992)
Geneplore model, Sternberg and Lubart’s (1996) creativity investment model and
Osborn’s (1963) Creative Problem Solving process model and its subsequent
modifications (Isaksen, Dorval & Treffinger, 2000; Noller, Parnes & Biondi, 1976,
Parnes, 1981, 1988; Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2005; Treffinger et al., 1994). Whether
it is stages, components or specific conscious or unconscious cognitive processes and
skills, all these models mentioned above suppose that an individual engages in cognitive
processing of some sort to produce novel and useful results (Lubart, 2001). Mumford,
Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, and Doares (1991) proposed a framework that helped
categorize cognitive sub processes into a set of core processes that occur in the following
loosely sequence: (a) problem construction; (b) information encoding and retrieval; (c)
category search (relevant schemas); (d) specification of optimum fitting categories; (e)
combination and reorganization of category information to find novel solutions; (f) idea
evaluation; and (g) implementation and monitoring. In turn, these core processes
underlying the creative process (Mumford et al., 1991) can be synthesized (for the sake of
analytical simplicity) into three process-clusters: (a) attention and encoding of
information; (b) retrieval and manipulation of information; and (c) evaluation and
decision-making. Before digging deeper into analyzing the role of emotions in
modulating the cognitive processes described above, first it’s necessary to review how
the field of creativity has traditionally linked emotions to the creative process and
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secondly, elaborate on the findings from the field of neuroscience on the interplay
between emotions and cognition.

Traditional views on Emotion and the Creative Process
The traditional relationship between emotion (in much of the creativity literature
referred to as affective states) and the creative process is two-tiered. First, different
affective states either facilitate or hinder the creative process. Second, different affective
states influence the motivation for creativity, in particular, that of intrinsic motivation
(Amabile, 1985; Collins & Amabile, 1999; Hennessey, 1999). With regard to the
affective states that facilitate creativity, there is literature that has tied affective disorders
(mood swings and states of mania) with heightened creative states characterized by
episodes of exacerbated creative productivity (Andreasen, 1987; Flaherty, 2005; Runco,
2007). There is mixed evidence as to whether it is that positive or negative moods
facilitate the creative process (Runco, 2007). However, recent research has tipped the
balance towards positive mood as an affective state that is more conducive to creative
performance (Amabile et. 2005; Isen, 1999; Kaufman, 2003; Zhou & George, 2003). In
spite of this, it is acknowledged that there might be differences across domains with
regard to the influence of positive and negative moods in the creative process (e.g.
organizational creativity, artistic creativity, scientific creativity, etc.; Runco, 2007). On a
different train of thought but related to affective states conducive to creativity, Treffinger
(1980) proposed a three-stage model for creative learning with consideration of both
cognitive and affective dimensions that facilitate the creative process and creative
learning. Among the affective factors contributing to creativity he described curiosity,
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openness to experience, tolerance for ambiguity, openness to complex feelings, conflict
relaxation, psychological safety in fantasy and imagery, and commitment to productive
living towards self-actualization. Note the resemblance of these affective factors to the
creative personality traits described previously in this chapter. In a similar fashion,
Puccio et al. (2005) have detailed the affective skills that complement the cognitive skills
in the thinking skills model of creative problem solving. Among these affective skills that
facilitate the process, they mentioned curiosity, dreaming, sensing gaps, playfulness,
avoiding premature closure, sensitivity to the environment and tolerance for risks. The
second avenue by which emotions have been traditionally linked with the creative
process has been through the affective modulation of intrinsic motivation. Research has
shown that individuals perform most creatively when personal interests, a sense of
challenge, a sense of enjoyment, and personal satisfaction fuel their creative behaviors
(Amabile, 1985; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988). In other words, when their motives for
creative engagement respond to intrinsic motivation stimuli as opposed to extrinsic
motivation stimuli. Hennessey (1999) has theorized that extrinsic constraints (like
rewards) are not detrimental to creative performance per se. What undermines creative
performance in presence of extrinsic motivation is the negative affective state that
germinates as a consequence of the link between extrinsic constraints and stereotyped
unpleasant tasks (e.g. rewards mean that there is work ahead, and many individuals
regard work as an unpleasant task). As opposed to the latter affective state, an individual
engaging in intrinsic motivation driven tasks would experience what Csikszentmihalyi
(1990) termed as Flow, understood as a moment-by-moment enjoyment and alignment
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between the self and the task. This state of flow facilitates the creative process
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Without undermining the relevance of the relationship between affective states
and the creative process as described above, the field of neuroscience is offering evidence
that the influence of emotions might go beyond the modulation of the affective states that
facilitate the creative process. Consequently, the evidence is pointing to the direction that
emotions are a direct regulator of several cognitive processes, the same processes
described previously as governing the creative process.

Emotion and Cognition: Evidence from Neuroscience
In a literature review of neuroimaging studies of emotions and cognition, Duncan
and Barret (2007) claimed that there is enough evidence to hold affect (emotions) as a
form of cognition. Moreover, they affirmed that the distinction held in past years between
these two seemingly distinct mental processes, is more phenomenological rather than
ontological. In Duncan and Barret’s (2007) words:
Our review of the neuroanatomical and neuroimaging literature reveals, however,
that no brain areas can be designated specifically as ‘‘cognitive’’ or ‘‘affective’’.
Although it is the case that subcortical regions are regulated by prefrontal cortical
regions, this state of affairs does not inevitably translate into the conclusion that
cognitive parts of the brain regulate affective parts of the brain. Instead, it appears
that affect is instantiated by a widely distributed, functional network that includes
both subcortical regions (typically called ‘‘affective’’) and anterior frontal regions
(traditionally called ‘‘cognitive’’). As a result, parts of the brain that have
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traditionally been called ‘‘cognitive’’ participate in instantiating an affective state,
not merely regulating that state after it has been established. Furthermore, the
parts of the brain that have traditionally been called ‘‘affective’’ participate in
cognitive processes. The so-called ‘‘affective’’ brain areas (e.g., the amygdala and
brainstem) participate in sensory processing and contribute to consciousness in a
manner that meets most definitions of ‘‘cognition’’. (p. 1187-1188)
Duncan and Barret elaborated extensively in the direct role that emotions play in
cognitive processes such as sensory stimuli processing, attention and awareness to
external and internal stimuli, language generation, memory encoding (valence), memory
retrieval, and information manipulation. Levine (2007) made similar observations stating
that the role of emotion in decisions among competing behaviors is at times a guide to
information, a selective attention spotlight, a motivator of behavior, and a common
currency for comparing alternatives. It is widely accepted that the creative process allows
individuals to navigate from ill-defined scenarios to states of resolution (Mumford,
Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, & Fleishman, 2000). Neuroscience research (with patients that
have had localized brain injuries) has revealed that one of the key mechanisms by which
individuals cope with ambiguity and ill-defined situations is with the use of emotions as a
guideline to decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Naqvi, Shiv & Bechara, 2006; Stein,
2007). In addition, evaluation is an instrument for decision-making and it is also a core
process within the creative process, in particular during the convergent thinking stages of
creativity (Mumford et al., 1991; Puccio et al., 2007). Damasio (2001) was emphatic that
the ability to generate many novel associations and combinations would be useless if we
did not have the ability to evaluate and make decisions, which precisely calls upon the
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emotional decision-making mechanism. In this vein of thought and drawing from the
related field of artificial intelligence (AI), Boden (1998) emphasized that the evaluative
processes pertinent to the creative process are extremely difficult to model by AI. The
main difficulties in modeling such processes reside in the fact that identifying criteria that
is relevant to evaluate ideas is extremely personal, cultural and contextual sensitive. In
this line of thought, Boden (1988) stated: “For example, just why we like or dislike
something will often have a lot to do with motivational and emotional factors −
considerations about which current AI has almost nothing to say” (p. 354). LeDoux
(1989, 1996) remarked that emotions guide evaluation and decision-making mostly in an
unconscious fashion, and therefore, that emotions directly modulate attention to stimuli
and cognition (whether we are aware of such processes or not).
One important concept that has been stressed by several neuroscientists in past
years is the emotional valance related to the cognitive appraisal of stimuli (Damasio,
2001; Dietrich, 2004; Duncan & Barret, 2007; Flaherty, 2005; LeDoux, 1989, 1996,
Stein, 2007). The emotional valence of a stimulus can be defined as the affective
significance that an individual assigns (either consciously or unconsciously) while he or
she experiences the stimulus (Flaherty, 2005; LeDoux, 1996). The most basic form of
affective significance is whether the stimulus is pleasant or unpleasant and whether it is
conducive to arousal or relaxation (Duncan & Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1989, 1996; Stein,
2007). Consequently, it is the assignment of affective valences to stimuli (ranging from
basic survival values to social significance) that determines the strength with which
stimuli are experienced, the vividness with which these stimuli will be subsequently
encoded in memory, and the kind of bonds that these memories will generate with other
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encoded stimuli (Duncan & Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1996; Stein, 2007). Considering the
above, emotions would modulate associative processes by directly influencing the
repertoire and availability of stored content in memory. In other words, the vividness,
quality, and associative resonance of a stored stimulus are determined by the strength of
the affective valence (either positive or negative) with which the memory was
experienced and subsequently encoded (Duncan & Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1996; Stein,
2007).
More directly related to the creative process, Dietrich (2004) stated that emotions
were one possible source for creative insight. An individual may deliberately recall
emotional memories into to working memory for manipulation and/or let a novel
unconscious emotional associations emerge spontaneously into awareness in the form of
insight. Nevertheless, he stated that although it is useful to separate cognitive factual
processing from emotional processing in terms of conceptual analysis, in reality, factual
and emotional processes are tightly weaved and massively distributed in the brain, and
the same holds true while the brain is engaged in the creative process (Dietrich, 2004).
Epstein (2004) stated that the process of metaphor (analogical thinking), recognized by
creativity scholars to be one of the highest levels of associative thinking (Gordon, 1961;
Harrington, 1981; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Weisberg, 1995), involves all dimensions of
thought. For example, a successful work of art is a pleasing reflection of our sensory,
emotional and cognitive neural functions (Epstein, 2004). Lastly, there is growing
evidence that the release of the neurotransmitter dopamine, related to the emotionalreward system of the brain, decreases the latent inhibition threshold or the filter for the
amount of stimuli that we deem as relevant. This lower latent inhibition threshold makes
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us more sensible to the environment, facilitates flexible attention, selection of stimuli,
and overall cognitive flexibility (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Stein, 2007)

Emotion at the Core of the Creative Process
As reviewed in the previous section, there are indications that emotion and
affective states may play a more direct role than the just being a motivational drive to the
creative process, but of directly intervening and modulating the cognitive processes
underlying the creative process. Accordingly, Isen (1999) presented a review of more
than 25 studies in which positive affect had a significant influence in different cognitive
processes underlying creativity. According to her research, there would be three ways in
which affective states, and in particular positive affective states, would intervene in
cognitive processing. First, positive affect enhances the quantity of stimuli available for
associations. Second, it expands the breadth of relevant possible stimuli to be considered
in a problem-solving scenario. Third, it increases over all cognitive flexibility and
therefore, increases the probability that two concepts might be associated in a novel way.
In this vein of thought, Amabile et al.’s (2005) study in real world organizational setting
casted evidence that there was a linear relationship between positive affect and the
creative process and that therefore, people’s positive feelings and creative cognitions
were complexly interwoven in their daily work lives. On a different but related research
thread, Russ and Schafer (2006) conducted a study to test the relationship between affect
and creativity, specifically the relationship between affect in children’s play, emotional
memories and divergent thinking. Interestingly, they found stronger evidence supporting
the relationship between negative affect in play (as measured by the Affect in Play Scale)
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and scores of divergent thinking than positive affect and scores of divergent thinking (the
latter only correlated with scores of originality at levels of r = .34, p < .05). As expressed
earlier in this section, it is necessary to further investigate the influence of positive and
negative affect (and moods) in the creative process and the need to differentiate
influences across different domains. In addition, Russ and Schafer (2006) also found that
children’s emotional memories scores correlated with divergent thinking scores. This
results supported Isen’s (1999) premise that access to emotions in memories broadens the
scope of associative processes (Russ & Schafer, 2006). A secondary hypothesis of this
study, that is key to the present research’s primary question, was that the use of
emotionally laden stimuli should yield higher levels of divergent thinking scores than
emotionally neutral stimuli. The results of their study did not exhibit significant
differences between scores of divergent thinking induced by emotional-laden objects
versus emotional-neutral objects. Nonetheless, the authors recognize that there might
have been a flaw in their methodology as it was a panel of adults that determined which
stimuli were emotional-laden and which were emotional-neutral as opposed to having
children categorize the nature of the stimuli (Russ & Shaffer, 2006).
Lastly, Lubart and Getz (1997) have proposed a theoretical model of emotional
resonance for the construction of metaphorical figures during the creative process. This
model serves a theoretical umbrella for the present research study and hence, it will be
described in detail. Drawing from the concept of emotional valence explained earlier, the
authors elaborated on the concept of endocepts to denote the idiosyncratic emotions
attached to concepts, objects, peoples, and events represented in memory (Lubart & Getz,
1997). Their model is built upon three premises: (a) all images and concepts in memory
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have an attached endocept; (b) that there is a mechanism of automatic endocept
resonance that propagates an active emotional wave through memory and activates other
endocepts; and (c) a resonance threshold mechanism that determines whether or not an
activated endocept will enter into working memory and consciousness (Lubart & Getz,
1997). With regard to the resonance propagating mechanism, they hypothesized that
when an image is activated (either by internal or external stimuli), the idiosyncratic
emotional valence of that image is also activated and moreover, it is propagated as a
wave through memory and the associational cortices of the brain. Therefore, other
endocepts proximate to the propagated endocept might be activated and their attached
images brought into awareness along with the original image. If two images or concepts
share proximate affective tones, they might be perceived as more related and the latter
favors possible associations (Lubart & Getz, 1997). Regarding the threshold mechanism,
it determines whether an activated endocept and its corresponding image will receive
further attention and processing in working memory. Hence, it regulates the quantity of
associated concepts handled at a single time. Lubart and Getz hypothesized that
individuals differ in their threshold sensitivity and that the latter would be determined by
an individual’s attunement to his or her own emotions. Note how the above-mentioned
mechanism is linked with an individual’s emotional intelligence and emotional creativity
level described previously. Also, emotional sensitivity might fluctuate according to an
individual’s affective swings (Flaherty, 2005; Isen, 1999; Lubart & Getz, 1997).
To illustrate the endocept resonance mechanism described above, consider the
following example from Lubart and Getz (1997):
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…we describe a classroom demonstration that we conducted with 20 business
school students in Paris. The problem was to redesign and improve elevators.
Students began by accessing their elevator endocept through a structured list of
emotional descriptors. For example, one student viewed elevators as restrictive,
boring, and cold. After activating the elevator endocept, the resonance with other
endocepts was hypothesized to occur automatically. Students then named a
diverse set of objects that they felt were emotionally similar to an elevator. One
student, for example, suggested a cage for animals at a zoo because these cages
also felt confining (''caged in"), boring, and cold ("uninviting"). An association
was formed between caged animals and elevators; animal cages were a potential
source domain for a metaphor that captured a novel perspective on elevators, the
focus of the original problem. Developing the metaphor that an elevator is a zoo
cage, the student reasoned that, like animals, people may find their cage boring
because they see the same scenery everyday. One idea resulting from this
metaphor was to change the displays (e.g., posters) on elevators walls every so
often. Another insight from the zoo cage metaphor was that people find the
elevator uninviting because it lacks features of their natural habitat; elevators
could be improved by furnishing them in the style of a person's living room. (p.
296)
In light of the above theory, Lubart and Getz hypothesized that emotional driven
metaphors enhance the probability of novel associations between two or more remote
concepts (through endocept resonance), as compared to purely cognitive-factual driven
metaphors. Note that individual differences must be accounted for in terms of
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individual’s attunement with their emotions, resonance threshold level and overall
environmental conditions that foster creativity. With the above considerations in mind,
the latter hypothesis is precisely the main hypothesis of the present research study in the
attempt to empirical test the power of emotions as a vehicle for generating high degrees
of novel associations conducive to creativity. As expressed before, it is necessary to keep
in mind that the creative process involves several other cognitive processes, beside the
associative processes being emphasized in this study, in order to yield ideas that are both
novel and useful (Mumford et al, 1991; Puccio et al., 2007).
Summing up, there has been an ongoing quest in the field of creative studies (and
recently neuroscience and artificial intelligence) to reveal the underlying mental
processes that govern the creative process. Mumford et al. (1991) comprised a list of core
processes that have appeared in several models of the creative process and these could be
synthesized in three process-clusters: (a) attention and encoding of information; (b)
retrieval and manipulation of information (associations/combinations); and (c) evaluation
and decision-making. Traditionally, emotions have been linked to the creative process
first, in the form of the affective states that are conducive to creativity and secondly, as
responsible for fueling creative drive, in particular, through intrinsic motivation
(Amabile, 1985; Collins & Amabile, 1999; Hennessey, 1999). Although there is still no
clear-cut evidence with regard to whether positive or negative affective states would be
conducive to creativity, Amabile et al.’s (2005) study casted evidence for a linear
relationship between positive affect and creativity in organizational settings.
Without denying the relevance of the above relationship between emotions and
the creative process, the field of neuroscience has yielded evidence that emotions might
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play a significant role in directly modulating the cognitive processes involved in the
creative process. Duncan and Barret (2007) advocated that there is enough evidence to
even disregard the distinction between cognition and emotions. Research studies have
pointed out that emotions would directly govern processes such as selective attention,
memory encoding and memory retrieval (Duncan & Barret, 2007; LeDoux, 1996). In
addition, emotions are part of the decision making mechanism, in particular, when in
presence of ill-defined scenarios (Damasio, 1994, 2001; Naqvi et al., 2006; Stein, 2007).
Ill-defined and ambiguous situations are precisely the kind of situations that have been
acknowledged to benefit the most out of creative behavior (Mumford et al., 2000). It’s
important to revisit the concept of emotional valence, or the affective significance given
by an individual to the way he experiences stimuli and subsequently encodes them into
memory (Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004; Duncan & Barret, 2007; Flaherty, 2005;
LeDoux, 1989, 1996, Stein, 2007). Isen (1999) reviewed more than 25 studies that would
substantiate the influence of emotions in cognitive processing. In general, positive affect
enhanced individual’s cognitive flexibility and the latter was conducive to higher degrees
of creativity. Russ and Schafer (2006) reported significant correlations between
emotional memory and divergent thinking, meaning that indeed access to emotions in
memories broadens the scope of associative processes. Lastly, Lubart and Getz (1997)
emotional resonance theory of metaphor was reviewed in light of its relevance to the
research questions of the present study. This theory regarded the emotional valence of
encoded stimuli to be a potential mechanism to form associations between remote or
distant factual concepts but who are proximate in their affective tone. They hypothesized
that the kind of metaphors and associations driven by concepts linked through endocept

Review of Literature

44

resonance should yield higher degrees of novelty than those associations driven by pure
cognitive-factual representations. The latter is precisely the main hypothesis that present
research study is attempting to validate.

Chapter Summary
The present chapter set to deliver key definitions and concepts in order to provide
a better understanding of the rationale, research questions and methodology used in this
research study. In addition, an attempt was made to present an extensive review of the
body of literature, theories and research on the relationship between emotions and the
creative process. Although the focus of this study is on process, the creative phenomenon
can only be understood from a systems view, meaning that considerations must be taken
with regard to the interactions between the creative process, creative personality and
creative environment that result in the creative product. Consequently, a review of the
relationship between emotion and both, the creative personality and the creative
environment, was provided to illustrate how emotion intervenes at different facets of the
creative phenomenon. Lastly, a theoretical model of emotional driven metaphoric
thinking was reviewed as it provides the foundations for this research study’s questions
and hypotheses.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed account of the methodology
and experimental design used in this investigation. A rationale is presented for the
overarching experimental methodology used as well as details on the procedures used to
generate and collect data.

Methodology Background
This was a quantitative experiment based on Amabile’s (1982) consensual
assessment technique (CAT) to assess a product’s creative qualities. Under this
framework, a product, concept and/or idea is deemed creative to the extent that a number
of independent domain experts can agree it is creative. A domain expert is any individual
that has familiarity and competency in a given domain of inquiry (e.g. an artist for
evaluating artistic work). Consequently, creativity can be regarded as a quality of such
products judged to be creative. In addition, it can be inferred that the process by which
the product came to fruition can also be viewed as creative (Amabile, 1982). The above
framework is in line with MacKinnon’s (1978) view on the assessment of creativity; the
best way to study creativity is by examining the creative products of individuals.
Therefore, the creative product is a crystallized synthesis of the interacting forces
between the creative personality, the creative process and environment (Amabile, 1982;
MacKinnon, 1978).
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Experimental Design and Task Description
The research design involved one control group and two treatment groups with
only post test observation data collection. The experiment consisted in having individuals
create an artistic collage composition (a creative product) under two different treatment
conditions and a control condition, which later were rated by independent domain experts
in number of dimensions, including creativity. Although it is reasonable to assume that
creating a collage composition is subject to an individual’s artistic skills, Amabile (1982)
stated that the collage activity is among the least demanding task in terms of artistic skills
as opposed to other artistic endeavors such as drawing, sculpting and/or painting. Despite
the above, and as way to control for artistic skill, an artistic proficiency questionnaire was
administered to all participants where they were asked to rate themselves in their level of
artistic skill on a scale from one (low level) to five (high level).
Other benefits of using the collage task are that it allows for a variety of
expressions, a considerable flexibility in responses, different degrees of novelty, and
overall, its output is a distinct product that can be assessed in a number of dimensions,
including creativity, by independent observers (Amabile, 1982). A pilot experience was
carried involving twelve graduate students from the International Center for Studies in
Creative, Buffalo State College prior to the research study to test the appropriateness of
the collage task. This pilot experience confirmed that the collage task complied with the
above criteria and in addition, it was executable in a reasonable lapse of time,
approximately thirty minutes.
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The Treatment Conditions
The anchor theme for the research study’s collage task was New Year’s Eve. The
control group and both experimental groups participants were instructed to represent as
creatively as possible what New Year’s Eve meant them (see appendices A1 and A2). The
treatment condition for both experimental groups consisted in a narrative-priming
stimulus in the context of the New Year’s Eve theme (see appendices B1 and B2). The
control group did not receive any priming stimulus besides the baseline instruction
described above. Research has indicated that text narrative is an effective medium to
elicit a reader’s emotional response (Cupchick, Oatley, & Vorderer, 1998; Soederberg &
Stine, 1995). The narrative-priming stimulus had two forms, one factual and one
emotional. The factual narrative was meant to convey information in the form of facts
about the New Year’s Eve theme as way of providing further factual stimulation to
ideation and the creative process. The emotional narrative was meant to elicit an
emotional response around the New Year’s Eve theme and at the same time, activate an
individual’s emotional resonance mechanism (Lubart & Getz, 1997) in consonance with
their creative process. Consequently, one experimental group was denominated as the
Factual Group and the other experimental group was denominated as the Emotional
Group throughout the research study.
The narratives were written by the researcher and, following Amabile’s (1985)
protocol, they were put through a two-stage refinement and validation process. First, and
in an iterative process, three graduate students helped refine the structure and content of
the narratives. Second, a sample of 40 undergraduate students enrolled in courses CRS
201 and CRS 303, at Buffalo State College, NY, representative of the research study’s
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demographic sample, rated the narratives’ emotional content. In doing so, the 40 students
were randomly assigned to one of two groups (20 individuals per group), either to the
emotional narrative rating group or the factual narrative rating group. Individuals were
kept blind as to which narrative they were rating. To rate the level of emotional content
of the narratives, each individual read their respective narrative and proceeded to rate it
using a likert scale instrument that ranged from a score of one (absolutely factual content)
to a score of seven (absolutely emotional content) (see appendix C). The mean score for
the emotional narrative was 5.05, whereas the mean score for the factual narrative was
2.6. Due to the fact that the rating score data set did not distribute normally, the MannWhitney U test was used to compare the mean scores between the two groups. The value
obtained was U = 69.00 at a p < .01. The above indicated that the mean score for the
emotional content was significantly different between the two narratives, meaning that
the emotional narrative indeed was rated with higher emotional content than the factual
narrative. In addition, the factual narrative score was skewed towards the absolutely
factual content end of the continuum of the likert scale whereas the emotional narrative
mean score was skewed towards the absolutely emotional content end of the continuum
of the likert scale, which contributed to the validation of priming stimuli.

Research Study Sample
The sample for this research study comprised 75 individuals drawn from three
sections of undergraduate creative studies CRS 205 course at Buffalo State College.
Individuals within each section (approximately 25 individuals per section) were randomly
assigned using a web number randomizer (Retrieved December 4, 2008 from
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http://www.randomizer.org) to either the control group or one of the two experimental
groups. A voluntary written consent form was administered to all participants. The final
number of participants was 65 individuals, from which 51 were female and 14 were male.
Twenty individuals, 13 female and 7 male, composed the final control group and their
average age was 18.5 years. Twenty-three individuals, 19 female and 4 male, composed
the emotional experimental group and their average age was 18.59 years. Finally, twentytwo individuals, 19 female and 3 male, composed the factual experimental group, and
their average age was 18.86 years.

Experimental Logistics
The experiment was carried out at a large conference hall at Buffalo State College
during a class hour period for each CRS 205 sections respectively. This meant that the
testing protocol was ran three times, one for each section, in the same room and
following the exact same sequence of events. The room was setup with three rows of long
tables that sat approximately nine individuals with an appropriate workspace.
Consequently, and for each of the three sections, in the first row sat all control group
participants, in the second row all emotional group participants and in the third row all
factual group participants.
Participants were provided with an envelope that contained: (a) consent form, (b)
art proficiency questionnaire, (c) instruction sheet, (d) either the emotional or the factual
narrative (if he/she was part of one of the experimental groups), (d) task reflection
questionnaire and (f) the collage materials (see appendix D). The materials for the collage
comprised of a pair of scissors, a glue stick, a set of assorted color construction papers,
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and a piece of white cardboard (11’ x 7’). The entire testing protocol took 60 minutes
according to the following sequence of events:

Experimental Phase

Minutes

Introductions and distribution of experimental packets

5

Consent form / art proficiency questionnaire /Instruction briefing

5

Material inspection and collage planning (incubation period)

10

Collage Task

30

Complete task reflection questionnaire

5

Experiment wrap up

5

As described above, at the end of the collage task participants were asked to
complete a Task Reflection Questionnaire. This was a four or five-item questionnaire
(depending whether participant had been assigned to the control or one of the
experimental groups, respectively). This questionnaire used a likert scale questions to
have participants reflect on the task and their creative process while working on the
artistic collage (see appendices E1 and E2).

Judging Protocol and Logistics
As mentioned above, the CAT framework (Amabile, 1982) is based on the ability
of independent domain experts to achieve a level of agreement in regard to the
assessment of a product. In this research study, as the product was an artistic collage, the
domain experts had to be any individual with familiarity and competency in the domain
of the visual arts. Accordingly, six judges were selected. Five of these judges were
practicing artists and graduate students at the Creative Arts Therapy program in Nazareth
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College, Rochester, NY. The sixth judge was an art teacher and Creative Studies graduate
student at Buffalo State College, Buffalo, NY.
Each judge rated the whole pool of collages independently and in a unique
random display order. Following Amabile’s (1982) rating protocol judges were given the
following set of instructions and supporting information. First, judges had to rate
according to their implicit definition and criteria for each of the 18 dimensions for each
collage. In other words, no definitions were provided at all, only descriptions for each
dimension (see appendix F).
Although the primary dimension of interest was the creativity dimension, the
rationale for having judges rate the collages in the 18 dimensions described above was to
be able to extract a pure creativity score. In this sense, they idea was to separate as much
as possible the creative qualities from the technical qualities when assessing each collage
(Amabile, 1982). Each rater was provided with background information regarding the
nature of the artwork such as, that undergraduate students participating in the research
study had been instructed to represent as creatively as possible in a collage composition
what the New Year’s Eve theme meant to them. In addition, raters were shown a picture
of the set of materials that each individual had been provided with. Raters were kept blind
to the fact that the collages were the output of a control group and two experimental
groups and to the overall purpose of the research study.
Second, and critical to the evaluation process, judges were instructed to rate a
specific collage as compared to the rest of the collages and therefore, stay away from
comparison to other external absolute standard or criteria for each of the proposed
dimensions. In this sense, raters were encouraged to discriminate among those collages
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that were best in show and those that were worst in show from the pool of collages,
regardless if by the rater’s criteria all collages were poor. Raters used a rating template
that had their rater code number, collage number, and a 25-point scale for each dimension
(see appendix G). Raters were given three hours to rate the pool of collages (N=65).

Additional Measure
In order to provide an extra layer of information, participants were requested to
complete the FourSight: The Breakthrough thinking profile measure (Puccio, 2002). This
measure is a self-report instrument that yields as an output, an individual’s preferences
for different operations associated with the Creative Problem Solving framework. From
the relative comparison of an individual’s scores, a creative problem solving style is
extracted. The scores on each of the four scales or preferences range from 9 to 45.
Because the creative problem-solving framework represents the natural process by which
any human being solves complex problems (Puccio, Murdock & Mance, 2007), an
individual’s problem solving style might provide some insight into the quality and nature
of the artwork created by the research participants. In fact, a previous study carried out by
McClean (2004) showed that the creativity scores of collages created by undergraduate
students, as rated by independent judges, correlated at different levels of significance to
each of the cognitive creativity styles as measured by FourSight.
Two weeks after completing the creative collage protocol, two out of the three
CRS 205 sections completed the FourSight measure during class hours. The third section
received the FourSight measure as a take home assignment. From the sections that
received the measure during class hours, 43 participants completed the measure, whereas

Methods & Procedures

53

from the remaining section, only one participant returned the completed measure.
Consequently, control group participants completed 14 measures, with a gender
distribution of seven males and seven females and an average age of 17.93 years.
Emotional treatment group participants completed 15 measures, with a gender
distribution of three males and 12 females and an average age of 18.73 year. Factual
treatment group participants completed 15 measures, with a gender distribution of two
males and 13 females and an average age of 18.27 years.

Chapter Summary
In this chapter the experimental methodology was outlined in full detail as well as
the procedures to generate and collect data. Chapter Four provides a report of the
collected data and quantitative analysis results .
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results of the quantitative analysis
pertaining this research study. SPSS 16.0.2 software for Mac OSX was used to calculate
all statistics reported in this chapter. As described in the previous chapter, this study
included three sources of data: (a) the task reflection questionnaire (participants
completed this questionnaire at the end of the collage task session); (b) six sets of domain
expert ratings per participant’s collage (each collage was rated on 18 scales); and (c) the
FourSight cognitive style measure.
Descriptive statistics are provided for all of the above variables and also interrater reliabilities for the 18 rating scales. The inter-rater reliabilities are crucial to the
consensual assessment technique (CAT) (Amabile, 1982) for two reasons. First, high
levels of agreement between judges (above 70%) make it conceptually and statistically
sound to aggregate scores into a total mean score for each participant for each of the 18
scales. The above allows manipulating the aggregated data and doing statistical
operations such as analysis of variance, correlations to other variables and regression
analysis. Second, a high level of agreement between judges makes it safer to assume that
the product under scrutiny indeed posses the qualities subscribed by the judges. For
example, let us suppose that the level of agreement in the scoring of the Creativity scale
by the six domain experts is above 70%. Then, if collage A is rated low on creativity
(mean score for all six judges) and collage B is rated high on creativity (mean score for
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all six judges), we can conclude with a high degree of confidence that indeed collage B is
more creative than collage A.
After presenting the descriptive statistics and reliability results, inferential
statistics were used to test for differences among the experimental conditions in this
study. The first analysis used analysis of variance tests to examine differences between
the three different conditions, control group, factual priming group and emotional
priming group, for each of the 18 dimensions assessed by the domain experts. According
to the hypotheses presented in Chapter One, there was an emphasis in assessing whether
there was a statistical difference in those scale/criterions associated with creativity
between the three treatment conditions. Additionally, correlations and linear regressions
were calculated between the three sources of data described above to extract possible
interaction effects between the variables.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1.1 shows the general descriptive statistics for the task reflection
questionnaire total scores. Tables 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4 show the descriptive statistics for
the Task Reflection Questionnaire total scores separated by experimental condition (i..e,
control group, emotional group, and factual group).

Results
Table 4.1.1.
Descriptive Statistics Task Reflection Questionnaire Total Scores All Participants

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative 1
Nature of the Ideas

65
65
65
45
65

5.65
6.23
5.54
5.02
4.51

1.243
0.948
1.160
1.602
1.659

1
4
1
1
1

7
7
7
7
7

1

Control Group participants did not answer this question

Table 4.1.2.
Descriptive Statistics Task Reflection Questionnaire Total Scores Control Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative 1
Nature of the Ideas

20
20
20

5.15
6.00
5.60

1.531
0.858
0.995

1
4
4

7
7
7

20

3.95

1.701

1

7

1

Control Group participants did not answer this question
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Table 4.1.3
Descriptive Statistics Task Reflection Questionnaire Total Scores Factual Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative
Nature of the Ideas

22
22
22
22
22

5.77
6.09
5.68
5.32
5.00

0.922
1.065
0.945
1.323
1.662

4
4
4
2
1

7
7
7
7
7

Table 4.1.4.
Descriptive Statistics Task Reflection Questionnaire Total Scores Emotional Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative
Nature of the Ideas

23
23
23
23
23

5.96
6.57
5.35
4.74
4.52

1.147
0.843
1.465
1.815
1.534

3
4
1
1
1

7
7
7
7
7

Table 4.2.1 shows the general descriptive statistics for the aggregated scores for
the 18 Rating Scales used by the domain experts to rate the pool of collages. Tables 4.2.2,
4.2.3, and 4.2.4 show the descriptive statistics for the aggregated scores for the 18 Rating
Scales used by the domain experts to rate the pool of collages separated by experimental
condition.
As a highlight, although the Creativity scale mean scores were similar between
control group (M = 12.93, SD = 3.092), factual priming group (M = 11.89, SD = 4.270),
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and the emotional priming group (M = 12.56, SD = 4.476), the variances for both groups
that received a priming stimulus were more than one SD higher than the variance for the
control group.
Table 4.2.1.
Descriptive Statistics 18 Rating Scales Total Scores All Participants

Variable

n

M

SD

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Aesthetical Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65
65

12.47
11.62
12.18
13.45
13.90
11.04
10.71
11.82
13.15
12.31
14.55
13.55
12.69
14.65
10.64
9.69
10.01
9.90

3.953
4.250
3.422
4.228
4.018
4.111
4.128
3.523
3.668
3.718
3.712
3.515
3.690
4.673
5.093
3.905
4.105
3.691

Minimum Maximum

4
3
3
2
2
2
2
5
5
4
5
4
5
5
2
2
2
2

20
22
19
22
22
22
21
20
20
21
22
20
20
24
20
20
20
18
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Table 4.2.2.
Descriptive Statistics 18 Rating Scales Total Scores Control Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Aesthetical Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

12.93
11.42
12.26
13.39
13.08
10.58
10.03
12.44
13.52
13.22
15.15
14.18
13.10
15.12
12.08
10.54
10.78
9.35

3.092
3.142
2.812
3.355
2.869
3.609
2.752
3.508
3.675
3.371
3.209
3.276
3.279
4.361
4.833
3.401
4.054
3.158

Minimum Maximum

6
6
9
8
8
5
5
8
8
7
11
8
8
9
4
5
4
3

17
17
16
18
18
17
14
20
20
21
22
20
20
24
20
17
20
14
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Table 4.2.3.
Descriptive Statistics 18 Rating Scales Total Scores Factual Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Aesthetical Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22

11.89
10.98
11.79
13.03
13.39
10.89
10.51
11.63
12.97
12.67
14.72
13.33
12.39
14.80
9.62
8.74
9.58
9.95

4.270
4.387
3.378
4.824
4.402
4.887
4.689
3.398
3.793
4.039
4.129
4.159
4.103
5.062
5.256
3.939
4.053
3.696

Minimum Maximum

4
3
6
2
2
2
2
6
5
4
6
4
6
6
2
2
3
4

20
20
16
20
22
22
21
17
20
19
20
20
19
23
19
16
17
18
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Table 4.2.4.
Descriptive Statistics 18 Rating Scales Total Scores Emotional Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Aesthetical Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

22
23
22
23
23
23
22
23
23
22
23
23
23
23
23
22
23
23

12.56
12.39
12.47
13.89
15.09
11.58
11.38
11.46
13.01
11.19
13.85
13.22
12.63
14.11
10.36
9.93
9.75
10.32

4.476
4.957
4.106
4.436
4.360
3.821
4.635
3.733
3.684
3.635
3.746
3.105
3.744
4.703
5.089
4.326
4.283
4.185

Minimum Maximum

4
4
3
2
5
4
3
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
2
2
2
2

20
22
19
22
22
20
21
19
20
20
20
19
19
22
20
20
18
17

Table 4.3.1 shows the general descriptive statistics for the FourSight scales total
scores. Note that from the total sample of 65 individuals only 44 of them were able to
complete the FourSight measure. Tables 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4 show the descriptive
statistics for the FourSight total scales total scores separated by treatment conditions.

Results
Table 4.3.1.
Descriptive Statistics FourSight Scores All Participants

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

44
44
44
44

30.73
28.66
28.89
31.57

5.087
5.779
6.233
5.675

21
16
15
19

43
41
40
44

Table 4.3.2.
Descriptive Statistics FourSight Scores Control Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

14
14
14
14

30.71
29.93
28.43
31.57

4.631
5.181
5.854
4.586

23
19
15
24

39
39
35
41

Table 4.3.3.
Descriptive Statistics FourSight Scores Factual Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

15
15
15
15

32.07
29.13
30.07
32.73

4.818
5.829
5.675
6.552

22
16
18
19

40
40
37
42
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Table 4.3.4.
Descriptive Statistics FourSight Scores Emotional Group

Variable

n

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

15
15
15
15

29.40
27.00
28.13
30.40

5.705
6.234
7.279
5.792

21
19
17
20

43
41
40
44

Next, Cronbach alphas were calculated for the FourSight measure. Table 4.3.5
shows the results of this analysis of internal consistency. Regarding the FourSight scale’s
Cronbach alphas, the reliabilities were acceptable considering the fact that the FourSight
measure is still a young psychometric instrument (see table 4.3.5).
Table 4.3.5.
FourSight Scales Cronbach Alphas

Variable

Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

!

0.675
0.721
0.790
0.752

Inter-Rater Reliabilities 18 Rating Scales
With regard to the inter-rater reliability coefficients, as reported by Amabile
(1982), these were calculated using the Spearman-Brown prediction formula:
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nr
1 + (n-1) r

Where n = number of judges and r = mean inter-rater correlation.
Given the above formula, the closer the inter-rater reliability coefficient is to a
value of 1, the higher the reliability and consequently, the degree to which judges agree
on the assessment of a particular scale. Considering the above, 16 out of the 18 scales
yielded coefficients either above or close to the .70 threshold level, which is considered
an acceptable inter-rater reliability for this kind of analysis (Amabile, 1982). The Novel
Idea scale yielded a coefficient .572 and the Emotional Evocativeness scale yielded a
coefficient of .544. The low coefficient on the Emotional Evocativeness scale comes as
no surprise as this is a very subjective criterion that is modulated by a myriad of factors
such as the rater’s personality, experience, his/her own attunement to emotions, etc. With
regard to Novel Idea scale, the low coefficient is surprising and interesting. On one hand,
one would expect that if the Creativity scale was highly reliable (.756), then the Novel
Idea scale should also be, as novelty is a core criterion of creativity (Amabile, 1988;
Boden, 1998; Stein, 1974). On the other hand, the fact that the inter-rater reliability for
this scale was low (while the Creativity scale coefficient was high), might be interpreted
that for some judges it was not enough for a collage to be novel in order to be judged
creative. This appears to support the widely accepted definition of creativity, where
something creative needs not only to be novel, but also useful. Table 4.4 summarizes the
inter-rater reliabilities for the 18 scales.
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Table 4.4.
Inter-rater Reliability Coefficients 18 Rating Scales

Variable

R

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Aesthetical Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

0.756
0.825
0.572
0.820
0.790
0.817
0.803
0.695
0.739
0.724
0.735
0.676
0.692
0.821
0.802
0.663
0.697
0.544

Analysis of Variance Among Treatment Conditions
A described in Chapter One, the focus of this research study was to assess the
effects on creative behavior and creative performance of individuals exposed to different
priming stimuli during their creative process. Accordingly, analysis of variance tests were
calculated to assess if there were any significant differences among the treatment
conditions with regard to the self-report Task Reflection Questionnaire and the 18 Rating
Scales used by the domain experts to rate the creative collages. With regard to the Task
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Reflection Questionnaire tests, due to the fact that this data set did not distribute
normally, the Kruskall Wallis test (H) was used instead of the ANOVA (F) test. The
results of this test show that there was a significant difference between the treatment
conditions for the Level of Enjoyment scale (H = 6.147, p = .046) and that the difference
observed in the Natrure of Ideas scale approached significance (H = 5.459, p = .065).
Results for all H tests are summarized in Table 4.5.1.
Table 4.5.1.
Kruskall Wallis Test Task Reflection Questionnaire

Variable

df

H

p

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative 1
Nature of the Ideas

2
2
2
1
2

4.101
6.147
0.355
1.070
5.459

0.129
0.046
0.837
0.301
0.065

1

Control Group participants did not answer this question

Because there was one significant H coefficient (Level of Enjoyment Scale) and
one H coefficient that approached significance (Nature of the Ideas), post hoc MannWhitney tests (U) were calculated comparing different set of pairs among treatment
conditions. When comparing the control group (no priming) with the factual group, there
was significant difference in the Nature of the Ideas scale (U = 137, p = .033), precisely
the scale that approached significance in Kruskall Wallis test (H). The above means that
those individuals that received the factual priming stimuli, self-reported that the ideas
they entertained while creating the collage were more “out of the box” than the ideas
entertained by those who received no priming stimuli (see table 4.5.2).
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Table 4.5.2.
Mann-Whitney test Control Group vs Factual Group

Variable

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Nature of the Ideas

U

p

166.0
199.0
208.5
137.0

0.160
0.576
0.761
0.033

When performing pair-comparisons between the control group and the emotional
group, there was a significant difference in the Level of Enjoyment scale (U = 136, p =
.012) while the difference in the Level of Engagement scale approached significance (U =
135.5, p = .060). Consequently, emotional group participants were more involved with
the task than control group participants (see table 4.5.3).
Table 4.5.3.
Mann-Whitney test Control Group vs Emotional Group

Variable

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Nature of the Ideas

U

p

155.5
136.0
218.0
179.0

0.060
0.012
0.762
0.206

Finally post hoc U tests between factual group and emotional group did not yield
any significant differences in any scale (see table 4.5.4).
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Table 4.5.4.
Mann-Whitney test Factual Group vs Emotional Group

Variable

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative
Nature of the Ideas

U

p

217.5
188.5
228.5
208.5
189.0

0.399
0.091
0.562
0.301
0.137

The second set of analysis of variance tests were calculated to assess whether
there were any significant differences among the treatment conditions and the 18 Rating
Scales aggregated scores (domain expert ratings). Because the 18 Rating Scales scores
distributed normally ANOVA (F) tests were used to calculate the coefficients.
Surprisingly, there were no significant F coefficients among the three conditions for any
of the 18 variables. The results for the ANOVA tests are summarized in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6.
ANOVA Tests 18 Rating Scales Among the Three Groups
Variable

df

F

p

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Overall Aesthetic Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

0.389
0.644
0.230
0.231
1.644
0.330
0.725
0.453
0.142
1.800
0.690
0.458
0.196
0.260
1.283
1.152
0.515
0.365

0.679
0.529
0.795
0.794
0.202
0.720
0.488
0.638
0.868
0.174
0.505
0.635
0.823
0.772
0.285
0.323
0.600
0.696

Correlation Coefficients Within the Three Sources of Data
Correlation coefficients among the items of the Task Reflection Questionnaire
items were calculated using Spearman’s [!] (referred to as rs), as opposed to Pearson
moment coefficients, because this data set didn’t follow a normal distribution.
Correlations were all positive and most of these significant at the level of p < .05. The
high correlation between the item Level of Engagement and Level of Enjoyment (rs =
.640, p < .01) was expected, as high levels of enjoyment while doing a task should be
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conducive to high levels of engagement in that task. Of particular interest is the high
correlation between the item of Contribution of the Narrative and the item of
Contribution of Emotions (rs = .544, p < .01). This correlation suggests that there might
be an interaction effect between the priming stimulus (the narrative), the use of emotion,
and creative thinking. More specifically, as self-reported by the participants, the more the
narrative stimulated their creative thinking, the more they self-reported using their
emotions to crystallize the ideas portrayed in their collages. The summary of all the
Spearman correlation coefficients is presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7.
Spearman Correlations Task Reflection Questionnaire

Variable

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of the Narrative
Nature of the Ideas

1

2

3

4

1.00
.640**
.175
.329*
.193

1.00
.315*
.346*
.308*

1.00
.544**
.264*

1.00
0.206

5

1.00

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations coefficients among items of the 18 Rating Scales were calculated
using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (r) as this data set distributed
normally. Almost all correlation coefficients were positive and significant meaning that
according to the judges’ perception, a good collage probably was better on every scale
than a poor collage. Although the Creativity scale correlated positively with all 17 scales,
it correlated most strongly with those scales that have a novelty criterion embedded such

Results

71

as the Novel Idea scale (r = .903, p < .01) and Novel Use of Material scale (r = .846, p <
.01). It is interesting such a high correlation between the Creativity Scale and the Novel
Ideas scale considering that the inter-rater reliability coefficient of the latter was
somewhat low. In addition, the Creativity scale also correlated strongly, at levels of r >
.80 (p < .01), with the Effort Evident scale, Variation in the Use of Shapes scale, Level of
Complexity scale, Overall liking scale, and Aesthetical Appeal scale. It is also worth
noting that the Technical Goodness scale, although it correlated at a high level with the
Creativity scale (r = .638, p < .01), it correlated at higher levels (r > .80, p < .01) with
scales associated to technical proficiency such as Overall Organization scale, Neatness
scale, and Pleasing Use of Shapes scale. The summary of all the product-moment
correlations for the 18 scales is presented in Table 4.8.

.718** .535** .594** .782** .587** .678** .706** .834** .819** .616** .702** .844** 1.00
.486** .308*

.583** .517** .416** .670** .477** .571** .567** .583** .560** .333** .420** .564** .596** .437** 1.00
.873** .709** .738** .799** .632** .688** .774** .795** .739** .470** .614** .772** .844** .627** .723** 1.00
.807** .641** .684** .752** .543** .611** .692** .804** .787** .532** .691** .818** .852** .713** .625** .948** 1.00
.619** .514** .599** .662** .547** .603** .660** .564** .521** .306*

Pleasing Use of Shapes

Symmetry

Expression of Meaning

Overall Liking

Overall Aesthetic Appeal

Emotional Evocativeness

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

.458** .519** .291*

.440** .509** .284*

18

.454** .590** .601** .506** .641** .709** .653** 1.00

.340** .383** .653** .778** .655** .921** .741** .692** 1.00

.321** .379** .656** .812** .730** 1.00

.785** .748** 1.00

.583** .436** .466** .631** .405** .486** .508** .736** .825** .657** .798** 1.00

0.241

.485** .294*

.268*

Pleasing Use of Color

.355** 0.122

Balance

0.238

.304*

Neatness

0.115

.566** .353** .462** .651** .345** .513** .495** .829** 1.00

17

Overall Organization

16

.638** .450** .514** .710** .494** .651** .634** 1.00

15

.824** .789** .717** .884** .872** .890** 1.00

14

Technical Goodness

13

Level of Complexity

12

.673** .625** .520** .866** .756** 1.00

11

Level of Detail

10

.804** .782** .743** .801** 1.00

9

.800** .759** .678** 1.00

8

Variation in the Use of Shapes

7

Effort Evident

6

.903** .773** 1.00

5

Novel Idea

4

.846** 1.00

3

1.00

2

Novel Use of Materials

1

Creativity

Variable

Pearson Product-Moment Correlations 18 Scales Aggregated Scores

Table 4.8.
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With regard to FourSight scores, correlations coefficients between the four scales
were calculated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (r) as this data set
distributed normally. All four scales (preferences) were positively correlated at levels of r
> .60 (p < .01), meaning that individuals’ preferences were complementary and not
competing. It is worth noting that the Developer scale yielded the strongest pattern of
correlations to the other three scales/preferences. This means that the higher the
Developer preference, the stronger the other preferences should be. In addition, it is no
surprise that the strongest correlation was found between the Developer and Clarifier (r >
.749, p < .01). As FourSight theory states, both preferences rely heavily on analytical
skills, yet for different outcomes in the context of the Creative Problem Solving
framework (Puccio, 2002). Table 4.9 summarizes all the correlation coefficients between
all four FourSight preferences.
Table 4.9.
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations FourSight Scores

Variable
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Clarifier
1.00
.616**
.749**
.641**

Ideator

1.00
.743**
.621**

Note. n = 44
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Developer

1.00
.712**

Implementer

1.00
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Correlations Among the Three Sources of Data
The first pattern of correlations analyzed between sources of data was between the
scores of the Task Reflection Questionnaire (self-report instrument) and the 18 Rating
Scales aggregated scores (domain experts assessments). Because the Task Reflection
Questionnaire data set did not distribute normally, the Spearman’s [!] was used to
correlate these two data sets. As Table 4.10 shows, this analysis yielded only one
significant coefficient. Contrary to these results, one would have expected some level of
convergence between an individual’s self-assessment of his creative process and the
evaluation by independent raters of the product of that creative process. The discussion
and implications of these results will be developed in the following chapter.

.110
.160
.114
.119
.301*
.132
.215
.051
-.052
-.137
-.090
.061
.116
-.061
-.144
.079
.109
.101

Level of Engagement

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Overall Aesthetic Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

Variable

-.047
.052
-.047
-.011
.170
.022
.055
-.056
-.181
-.227
-.208
-.087
-.058
-.138
-.109
-.041
-.040
-.037

Level of Enjoyment

Spearman Correlations Task Reflection Questionnaire & 18 Scales Aggregated Scores

Table 4.10.

.004
-.064
.000
-.079
.085
-.003
-.008
-.005
-.006
.050
-.041
-.021
-.057
-.024
-.133
-.098
-.032
-.047

.016
.022
-.012
.073
.173
.045
.036
-.009
-.055
-.055
-.142
.007
-.058
-.094
.141
-.041
-.022
.072

.064
.052
.136
-.138
.110
-.156
.030
-.161
-.080
-.156
.033
.009
-.050
.076
-.101
-.002
.006
.008

Contribution of Emotions Contribution of Narrative Nature of ideas
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The second pattern of correlations analyzed between sets of data was between the
scores of the Task Reflection Questionnaire and the Foursight scores. Because the Task
Reflection Questionnaire data set did not distribute normally, the Spearman’s [!] was
used to correlate these two data sets. As a highlight, the Contribution of the narrative
scale, meaning the extent to which receiving a narrative about New Year’s Eve
contributed to participants’ creative thinking, was highly correlated with the Clarifier
scale at a level of rs = .557, p < .01. The above resonates with FourSight theory, where
individuals with a high Clarifier preference benefit from additional data to form a
comprehensive picture of the task and/or challenge at hand (Puccio, 2002). Table 4.11
shows all correlation coefficients between the variable of these two data sets.
Table 4.11.
Spearman Correlations Task Reflection Questionnaire & FourSight Scores

Variable

Level of Engagement
Level of Enjoyment
Contribution of Emotions
Contribution of Narrative1
Nature of ideas

Clarifier

Ideator

-.087
.026
.159
.557**
.200

-.054
.170
-.002
.391*
.177

Developer

Implementer

-.076
.216
.092
.357
.215

.039
.255
.045
.383*
.272

Note. n = 44
Control Group participants did not answer this question
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

1

The last pattern of correlations analyzed between data sources was between the
FourSight scores and the 18 Rating Scales aggregated scores. Pearson product-moment
correlations were used to calculate the coefficients as both data sets distributed normally.
Surprisingly, there were no significant correlation coefficients between the variables of
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both data sets. Implications about this result will be explored in the next chapter. Table
4.12 shows all correlation coefficients for these two data sets.
Table 4.12.
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations FourSight Scores & 18 Scales Aggregated Scores

Variable

Clarifier

Ideator

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea
Effort Evident
Variation in the Use of Shapes
Level of Detail
Level of Complexity
Technical Goodness
Overall Organization
Neatness
Balance
Pleasing Use of Color
Pleasing Use of Shapes
Symmetry
Expression of Meaning
Overall Liking
Overall Aesthetic Appeal
Emotional Evocativeness

-.206
-.172
-.144
-.119
-.187
-.216
-.213
-.235
-.043
-.075
-.135
-.135
-.132
-.130
-.025
-.214
-.199
-.027

.057
.104
.137
.086
-.036
-.034
.009
-.036
0.016
-.095
-.046
.026
.008
.021
.237
.115
.110
.237

Developer

.000
.079
.118
-.010
-.008
-.169
-.058
-.169
-.042
-.168
-.059
-.078
-.095
-.066
.118
-.044
-.039
.076

Implementer

-.037
.062
.051
-.076
-.031
-.259
-.181
-.177
-.070
-.136
-.009
-.077
-.188
-.037
-.039
-.118
-.073
-.174

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Regression Analysis
Although there were no significant correlations between the FourSight scales and
the 18 Rating Scales aggregated scores (see table 4.12), and because all FourSight scales
were highly correlated amongst themselves (see table 4.9), linear regression analysis
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were used to assess the extent to which each individual preference (independent
variables) contributed to explaining the variance of each of the 18 Rating Scales
aggregated scores (dependent variables). A second series of linear regressions were
carried out for each of the dependent variables where the pool of participants was
separated by treatment condition. These set of regression analysis were done to assess
whether there was an interaction effect between treatment condition and FourSight
preference in explaining the variance of each of the 18 Rating Scales. Note that for the
above-mentioned analysis, only the 44 participants that completed the FourSight measure
data were used to run the regressions. Accordingly, when clustering participants per
treatment condition, the Control Group was comprised of 14 participants, the Factual
Group was comprised of 15 participants, and the Emotional Group was comprised of 15
participants.

Regression over the Creativity Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Creativity scale had an R2 = .114 yet the F
coefficient was not significantly different from zero (F (4, 39) = 1.249, p = .306).
Although the model was not significant, there was one significant B for the Clarifier
Scale (B = -.496, p < .05). Table 4.13.1 summarizes the results for this linear model.
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Table 4.13.1
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Creativity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.496
0.194
0.229
-0.002

4.064
-2.112
0.840
0.802
-0.008

0.00
0.041
0.406
0.428
0.994

Note. R = .337; R 2= .114; Adj. R 2 = .0233; SE = 3.93; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14) the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .213), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
.610, p = .666), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.13.2).
Table 4.13.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Creativity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.016
-0.479
-0.201
0.571

1.520
0.038
-0.792
-0.402
1.280

0.163
0.971
0.449
0.697
0.233

Note. R2 = .213; Adj. R 2 = -.136; SE = 3.30; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .025), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .064, p =
.991), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.13.3).
Table 4.13.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Creativity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.056
0.123
-0.120
-0.072

1.656
-0.120
0.240
-0.160
-0.121

0.129
0.907
0.815
0.876
0.906

Note. R2 = .025; Adj. R 2 = -.365; SE = 4.99; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .561) and its F coefficient approached significance (F (4, 10)
= 3.194, p = .065). In addition, the Clarifier scale’s B was highly significant (B = -1.251,
p < .01) and the Developer scale’s B approached significance (B = .871, p = .065). The
above results reveal the possibility that there might be an interaction effect operating
between problem solving preference and the nature of the stimulus with regard to creative
performance. In this case, given an emotional priming stimulus (emotional narrative), the
higher the clarifier preference for an individual the lower his creativity rating score as
assessed by independent domain experts. On the contrary, in the case of the Developer
preference, the interaction between the emotional priming stimulus and the problem
solving style is positive with regard to creative performance as assessed by independent
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domain experts (the scale had a positive B). The implications of this interaction effect
will be developed in detail in the following chapter. Table 4.13.4 summarizes the
coefficients of this regression model.
Table 4.13.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Creativity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-1.251
0.258
0.871
0.192

2.953
-3.240
0.839
2.077
0.575

0.014
0.009
0.421
0.065
0.578

Note. R2 = .561; Adj. R 2 = .385; SE = 3.51; N = 15

Regression over the Novel Idea Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Novel Idea scale had an R2 = .152, yet the F
coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.745, p = .160). Similar to the results of the
Creativity scale general regression (table 4.13), the Clarifier Scale B was significant at
the level of B = -.558 p < .05. Table 4.14.1 summarizes the results for this linear model.
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Table 4.14.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Novel Idea Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.558
0.179
0.387
0.022

3.961
-2.431
0.795
1.387
0.101

0.000
0.020
0.431
0.173
0.920

Note. R = .390; R 2= .152; Adj. R 2= .065; SE = 3.51; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14) the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .341), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
1.162, p = .389). The Ideator Scale B approached significance at the level of B = -1.102, p
= .078 (see table 4.14.2).
Table 4.14.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Novel Idea Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.029
-1.102
0.388
0.604

1.994
0.073
-1.989
0.847
1.477

0.077
0.943
0.078
0.419
0.174

Note. R2 = .341; Adj. R 2 = .047; SE = 2.67; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .048), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .127, p =
.969) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.14.3).
Table 4.14.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Novel Idea Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.125
0.290
-0.223
0.200

1.435
-0.272
0.574
-0.300
0.341

0.182
0.791
0.579
0.770
0.740

Note. R2 = .048; Adj. R 2 = -.332; SE = 3.96; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was quite high (R2 = .629) and it’s F coefficient significant (F (4, 10) = 4.234,
p < .05). In addition, both the Clarifier and Developer scales’ B’s were significant (B = 1.249, p < .01 and B = .867, p < .05 respectively). The above results replicate the
direction of the interaction effect described for the Creativity Scale between the
emotional priming stimulus and these two creative problem-solving styles with regard to
the assessment of the Novel Idea scale. It is worth recalling that the correlation
coefficient between the Creativity scale and the Novel Idea scale was very strong (r =
.903, p < .01) and so the interaction effect should follow the same direction. Table 4.14.4
summarizes the results for this linear model.
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Table 4.14.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Novel Idea Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-1.249
0.380
0.867
0.157

2.783
-3.518
1.344
2.248
0.509

0.019
0.006
0.208
0.048
0.622

Note. R2 = .629; Adj. R 2 = .48; SE = 3.35; N = 15

Regression over the Novel Use of Material Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Novel Use of Material scale had an R2 = .146
and the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.669, p = .117). Nonetheless, and
similar to the results reported on the two previous scales, the Clarifier Scale B was
significant at the level of B = -.573, p < .05. Table 4.15.1 summarizes the results for this
linear model.
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Table 4.15.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Novel Use of Materials Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.573
0.155
0.315
0.108

3.383
-2.487
0.687
1.126
0.492

0.002
0.017
0.496
0.267
0.626

Note. R = .382; R 2= .146; Adj. R 2= .059; SE = 4.12; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .089), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .220, p =
.921) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.15.2).
Table 4.15.2
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Novel Use of Materials Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.083
-0.087
-0.316
0.345

0.997
0.180
-0.133
-0.586
0.719

0.345
0.861
0.897
0.572
0.491

Note. R2 = .089; Adj. R 2 = -.316; SE = 3.60; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .149), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .439, p =
.778) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.15.3).
Table 4.15.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Novel Use of Materials Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.537
0.122
-0.093
0.385

2.024
-1.231
0.256
-0.133
0.692

0.070
0.247
0.803
0.897
0.505

Note. R2 = .149; Adj. R 2 = -.191; SE = 4.79; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .448) yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
10) = 2.029, p = .116). However there was one significant B coefficient for the Clarifier
scale, at the level of B = -1.080, p < .05. Table 4.15.4 summarizes the results for this
linear model.
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Table 4.15.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Novel Use of Materials Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-1.080
0.268
0.751
0.233

1.944
-2.495
0.779
1.598
0.621

0.081
0.032
0.454
0.141
0.549

Note. R2 = .448; Adj. R 2 = .227; SE = 4.36; N = 15

Regression over the Effort Evident Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Effort Evident scale had an R2 = .063, and the
F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .661 p = .663). There were no significant
B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.16.1).
Table 4.16.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Effort Evident Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.258
0.271
0.077
-0.134

3.634
-1.069
1.142
0.263
-0.582

0.001
0.292
0.260
0.794
0.564

Note. R = .252; R 2= .063; Adj. R 2= .033; SE = 4.31; N = 44
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When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .337), yet the F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
9) = 1.141, p = .397). The Developer scale’s B coefficient approached significance at the
level of B = -.923, p = .070. See Table 4.16.2 for a full summary of this prediction model.
Table 4.16.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Effort Evident Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.117
0.444
-0.923
0.162

1.711
0.295
0.799
-2.006
0.396

0.121
0.775
0.445
0.076
0.701

Note. R2 = .337; Adj. R 2 = .042; SE = 3.28; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .220), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= .705, p = .606), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.16.3).
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Table 4.16.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Effort Evident Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.414
0.096
0.235
-0.346

2.843
-0.990
0.210
0.351
-0.649

0.017
0.345
0.838
0.733
0.531

Note. R2 = .220; Adj. R 2 = -.092; SE = 5.13; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .267), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
.912, p = .493), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.16.4).
Table 4.16.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Effort Evident Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.442
0.255
0.604
-0.052

1.363
-0.886
0.642
1.116
-0.121

0.203
0.397
0.536
0.291
0.906

Note. R2 = .267; Adj. R 2 = -.026; SE = 4.49; N = 15
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Regression over the Variation in the Use of Shapes Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Variation in the Use of Shapes Scale had an
R2 = .075, and the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .792 p = .538). There
were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.17.1).
Table 4.17.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Variation in the Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.419
-0.020
0.288
0.045

4.356
-1.746
-0.085
0.987
0.195

0.000
0.089
0.933
0.330
0.846

Note. R = .274; R 2= .075; Adj. R 2= -.020; SE = 4.06; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .394), yet the F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
9) = 1.466, p = .290). The Implementer scale’s B coefficient approached significance at
the level of B = .805, p = .070. See Table 4.17.2 for a full summary of this prediction
model.
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Table 4.17.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Variation in the Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.105
-0.475
-0.245
0.805

1.628
-0.279
-0.895
-0.558
2.056

0.138
0.787
0.394
0.590
0.070

Note. R2 = .394; Adj. R 2 = .125; SE = 2.68; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .125), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .356, p =
.834), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.17.3).
Table 4.17.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Variation in the Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.213
-0.085
0.097
-0.194

2.638
-0.481
-0.175
0.137
-0.345

0.025
0.641
0.865
0.894
0.738

Note. R2 =- .125; Adj. R2 = -.225; SE = 4.87; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .249), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =

Results
.829, p = .536), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.17.4).
Table 4.17.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Variation in the Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.698
0.183
0.614
0.142

1.887
-1.382
0.456
1.120
0.325

0.089
0.197
0.658
0.289
0.752

Note. R2 = .249; Adj. R 2 = -.051; SE = 4.47; N = 15

Regression over the Level of Detail Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Level of Detail Scale had an R2 = .112, and
the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.228, p = .315). There were no
significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.18.1).
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Table 4.18.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Level of Detail Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.170
0.289
-0.043
-0.299

4.090
-0.723
1.251
-0.150
-1.334

0.000
0.474
0.218
0.881
0.190

Note. R = .334; R 2= .112; Adj. R 2 = .021; SE = 4.07; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .529), yet the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
2.531, p = .114). The Developer scale’s B coefficient was significant at the level of B =
-1.077, p < .05. See Table 4.18.2 for a full summary of this prediction model.
Table 4.18.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Level of Detail Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.160
0.400
-1.077
0.003

2.412
0.480
0.856
-2.779
0.008

0.039
0.643
0.414
0.021
0.994

Note. R2 = .529; Adj. R 2 = .320; SE = 2.96; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .333), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
10) = 1.246, p = .353), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales
(see table 4.18.3).
Table 4.18.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Level of Detail Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.306
0.048
0.352
-0.638

3.029
-0.792
0.113
0.566
-1.295

0.013
0.447
0.912
0.584
0.224

Note. R2 = .333; Adj. R 2 = .066; SE = 4.724; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .220), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= .707, p = .605), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.18.4).
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Table 4.18.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Level of Detail Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.324
0.41
0.358
-0.176

1.453
-0.631
1.003
0.640
-0.395

0.177
0.542
0.34
0.537
0.701

Note. R2 = .220; Adj. R 2 = -.091; SE = 3.99; N = 15

Regression over the Level of Complexity Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Level of Complexity Scale had an R2 = .109,
yet the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.193, p = .329). There were no
significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.19.1).
Table 4.19.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Level of Complexity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.356
0.214
0.223
-0.244

3.795
-1.510
0.927
0.778
-1.089

0.001
0.139
0.359
0.441
0.283

Note. R = .330; R 2= .109; Adj. R 2= .018; SE = 4.46; N = 44

Results

96

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .296), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
.948, p = .480) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table
4.19.2).
Table 4.19.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Level of Complexity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.127
0.222
-0.617
0.025

2.913
-0.311
0.388
-1.303
0.059

0.017
0.763
0.707
0.225
0.954

Note. R2 = .296; Adj. R 2 = -.016; SE = 2.302; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .233), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= .757, p = .576), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.19.3).
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Table 4.19.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Level of Complexity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.304
0.109
0.118
-0.391

2.597
-0.735
0.240
0.177
-0.741

0.027
0.479
0.815
0.863
0.476

Note. R2 = .233; Adj. R 2 = -.074; SE = 5.30; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .282), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
.980, p = .461), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.19.4).
Table 4.19.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Level of Complexity Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.629
0.336
0.564
-0.014

1.074
-1.274
0.854
1.053
-0.032

0.308
0.231
0.413
0.317
0.975

Note. R2 = .282; Adj. R 2 = -.006; SE = 5.56; N = 15
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Regression over the Technical Goodness Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Technical Goodness Scale had an R2 = .085,
yet the F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 37) = .907, p = .469). There were no
significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.20.1).
Table 4.20.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Technical Goodness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.255
0.256
-0.091
-0.108

4.522
-1.071
1.091
-0.312
-0.474

0.000
0.291
0.282
0.757
0.638

Note. R = .292; R 2= .085; Adj. R 2= .001; SE = 3.54; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .307), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
.997, p = .457) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table
4.20.2).
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Table 4.20.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Technical Goodness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.522
0.765
-0.418
-0.209

2.526
-1.292
1.346
-0.890
-0.500

0.032
0.229
0.211
0.397
0.629

Note. R2 = .307; Adj. R 2 = .000; SE = 3.51; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .410), however its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= 1.739, p = .218), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.20.3).
Table 4.20.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Technical Goodness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.095
0.033
0.079
-0.658

4.069
-0.261
0.083
0.135
-1.422

0.002
0.799
0.936
0.895
0.186

Note. R2 = .410; Adj. R 2 = .174; SE = 3.10; N = 15
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When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .115), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .324, p =
.856), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.20.4).
Table 4.20.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Technical Goodness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.550
0.062
0.354
0.264

1.590
-1.003
0.143
0.596
0.557

0.143
0.340
0.889
0.565
0.590

Note. R2 = .115; Adj. R 2= -.239; SE = 4.16; N = 15

Regression over the Overall Organization Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Overall Organization Scale had an R2 = .012,
its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .118, p = .957). There were no significant
B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.21.1).
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Table 4.21.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Overall Organization Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.019
0.127
-0.050
-0.101

3.613
-0.075
0.522
-0.167
-0.427

0.001
0.941
0.604
0.869
0.672

Note. R = .109; R 2= .012; Adj. R 2= -.089; SE = 3.83; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .154), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .410, p =
.797) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.21.2).
Table 4.21.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Overall Organization Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.135
0.753
-0.395
-0.398

1.843
-0.304
1.201
-0.761
-0.861

0.098
0.768
0.261
0.466
0.412

Note. R2 = .154; Adj. R 2 = -.222; SE = 4.06; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .113), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .320, p =
.857), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.21.3).
Table 4.21.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Overall Organization Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.073
-0.104
-0.078
-0.239

2.484
0.164
-0.213
-0.109
-0.421

0.032
0.873
0.836
0.915
0.683

Note. R2 = .113; Adj. R 2= -.241; SE = 4.23; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .145), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .425, p =
.787), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.21.4).
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Table 4.21.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Overall Organization Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.446
0.009
0.396
0.319

1.456
-0.828
0.020
0.677
0.684

0.176
0.427
0.984
0.514
0.510

Note. R2 = .145; Adj. R 2 = -.196; SE = 4.03; N = 15

Regression over the Neatness Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Neatness Scale had an R2 = .037, its F
coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .379, p = .822). There were no significant B’s
for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.22.1).
Table 4.22.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Neatness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.123
0.064
-0.256
-0.073

3.640
0.505
0.266
-0.860
-0.312

0.001
0.617
0.791
0.395
0.757

Note. R = .193; R 2= .037; Adj. R 2= -.061; SE = 3.83; N = 44
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When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .427), nonetheless its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
9) = 1.678, p = .238). The Implementer scale’s B coefficient approached significance at
the level of B = -.815, p = .061. See Table 4.22.2 for a full summary of this prediction
model.
Table 4.22.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Neatness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.473
0.804
-0.164
-0.815

4.040
-1.287
1.558
-0.384
-2.139

0.003
0.230
0.154
0.710
0.061

Note. R2 = .427; Adj. R 2 = .173; SE = 3.07; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .210), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= .665, p = .631), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.22.3).
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Table 4.22.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Neatness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.216
0.035
-0.632
0.019

2.485
0.514
0.075
-0.935
0.035

0.032
0.618
0.941
0.372
0.972

Note. R2 = .210; Adj. R 2 = -.106; SE = 4.25; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .080), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .217, p =
.923), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.22.4).
Table 4.22.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Neatness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.149
-0.191
0.075
0.376

1.341
-0.266
-0.429
0.124
0.778

0.209
0.796
0.677
0.904
0.455

Note. R2 = .080; Adj. R 2 = -.288; SE = 4.03; N = 15
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Regression over the Balance Rating Scale
The linear model for predicting the Balance Scale had an R2 = .029, its F
coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .290, p = .882). There were no significant B’s
for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.23.1).
Table 4.23.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Balance Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.237
0.003
0.033
0.118

4.276
-0.964
0.011
0.110
0.503

0.000
0.341
0.991
0.913
0.618

Note. R = .170; R 2= .029; Adj. R 2= -.071; SE = 3.84; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .130), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .337, p =
.847) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.23.2).
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Table 4.23.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Balance Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.407
0.155
0.039
-0.174

2.803
-0.900
0.244
0.075
-0.372

0.021
0.391
0.813
0.942
0.719

Note. R2 = .130; Adj. R 2 = -.256; SE = 3.597; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .098), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .271, p =
.890), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.23.3).
Table 4.23.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Balance Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.070
-0.054
-0.441
0.333

2.422
-0.156
-0.110
-0.610
0.581

0.036
0.879
0.915
0.555
0.574

Note. R2 = .098; Adj. R 2 = -.263; SE = 4.64; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .191), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
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= .590, p = .678), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.23.4).
Table 4.23.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Balance Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.689
0.018
0.476
0.377

1.937
-1.315
0.043
0.837
0.831

0.081
0.218
0.967
0.422
0.426

Note. R2 = .191; Adj. R 2 = -.133; SE = 3.99; N = 15

Regression over the Pleasing Use of Colors Scale
The linear model for predicting the Pleasing Use of Colors Scale had an R2 =
.041, its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .414, p = .797). There were no
significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.24.1).
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Table 4.24.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Pleasing Use of Colors Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.195
0.223
-0.067
-0.043

4.251
-0.798
0.928
-0.227
-0.183

0.000
0.430
0.359
0.822
0.856

Note. R = .202; R 2= .041; Adj. R 2= -.058; SE = 3.61; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .100), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .250, p =
.903) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.24.2).
Table 4.24.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Colors Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.167
0.496
-0.192
-0.006

1.297
-0.364
0.766
-0.359
-0.012

0.227
0.725
0.463
0.728
0.990

Note. R2 = .100; Adj. R 2 = -.300; SE = 3.74; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .148), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .436, p =
.780), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.24.3).
Table 4.24.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Colors Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.134
0.107
-0.212
-0.153

2.732
-0.308
0.224
-0.302
-0.276

0.021
0.765
0.827
0.769
0.788

Note. R2 = .148; Adj. R 2 = -.192; SE = 4.54; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .160), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .475, p =
.754), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.24.4).
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Table 4.24.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Colors Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.697
0.097
0.332
0.351

2.442
-1.306
0.228
0.573
0.758

0.035
0.221
0.824
0.580
0.466

Note. R2 = .160; Adj. R 2 = -.177; SE = 3.37; N = 15

Regression over the Pleasing Use of Shapes Scale
The linear model for predicting the Pleasing Use of Shapes Scale had an R2 =
.067, its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .700, p = .597). There were no
significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.25.1).
Table 4.25.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Pleasing Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.106
0.245
-0.008
-0.267

4.223
-0.440
1.036
-0.029
-1.160

0.000
0.662
0.306
0.977
0.253

Note. R = .259; R 2= .067; Adj. R 2= -.029; SE = 3.74; N = 44
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When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .067), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .161, p =
.953) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.25.2).
Table 4.25.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.128
0.360
-0.320
-0.032

1.631
-0.273
0.547
-0.587
-0.066

0.137
0.791
0.598
0.571
0.949

Note. R2 = .067; Adj. R 2 = -.348; SE = 3.81; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .433), however its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= 1.907, p = .186), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.25.3).
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Table 4.25.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.018
0.364
-0.281
-0.625

3.496
0.049
0.934
-0.491
-1.377

0.006
0.962
0.373
0.634
0.199

Note. R2 = .433; Adj. R 2 = .206; SE = 3.66; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .186), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
= .571, p = .690), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.25.4).
Table 4.25.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Pleasing Use of Shapes Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.572
-0.027
0.627
0.203

1.697
-1.088
-0.065
1.099
0.447

0.120
0.302
0.950
0.298
0.665

Note. R2 = .186; Adj. R 2 = -.140; SE = 4.00; N = 15
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Regression over the Symmetry Scale
The linear model for predicting the Symmetry Scale had an R2 = .035, its F
coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = .350, p = .842). There were no significant B’s
for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.26.1).
Table 4.26.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Symmetry Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.218
0.177
-0.059
0.035

3.458
-0.888
0.737
-0.198
0.148

0.001
0.380
0.466
0.844
0.883

Note. R = .186; R 2= .035; Adj. R 2= -.064; SE = 4.82; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .087), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .214, p =
.924) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.26.2).

Results

115

Table 4.26.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Symmetry Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.299
0.328
-0.083
-0.251

2.065
-0.646
0.503
-0.153
-0.522

0.069
0.534
0.627
0.881
0.614

Note. R2 = .087; Adj. R 2 = -.319; SE = 5.00; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .064), however its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
.171, p = .949), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.26.3).
Table 4.26.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Symmetry Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.038
0.100
-0.442
0.197

1.928
-0.083
0.199
-0.601
0.338

0.083
0.936
0.846
0.561
0.743

Note. R2 = .064; Adj. R 2 = -.311; SE = 5.80; N = 15
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When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .205), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
.646, p = .642), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.26.4).
Table 4.26.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Symmetry Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.720
0.278
0.254
0.350

1.569
-1.387
0.673
0.450
0.778

0.148
0.195
0.516
0.662
0.455

Note. R2 = .205; Adj. R 2 = -.113; SE = 4.96; N = 15

Regression over the Expression of Meaning Scale
The linear model for predicting the Expression of Meaning Scale had an R2 = .139
and its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.576, p = .200). The Ideator Scale B
approached significance at the level of B = .423, p = .070 (see table 4.27.1).
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Table 4.27.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Expression of Meaning Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.249
0.423
0.185
-0.274

2.165
-1.077
1.863
0.656
-1.239

0.037
0.288
0.070
0.516
0.223

Note. R = .373; R 2= .139; Adj. R 2= .051; SE = 4.96; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .237), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) =
.698, p = .612) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table
4.27.2).
Table 4.27.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Expression of Meaning Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.282
0.726
-0.594
-0.289

0.520
0.665
1.217
-1.204
-0.657

0.616
0.523
0.254
0.259
0.528

Note. R2 = .237; Adj. R 2 = -.102; SE = 5.07; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .267), however its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
10) = .910, p = .495), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales
(see table 4.27.3).
Table 4.27.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Expression of Meaning Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.479
0.235
0.674
-0.566

1.675
-1.183
0.531
1.035
-1.097

0.125
0.264
0.607
0.325
0.298

Note. R2 = .267; Adj. R 2 = -.026; SE = 5.33; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was moderate (R2 = .278), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
.961, p = .470), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.27.4).
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Table 4.27.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Expression of Meaning Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.681
0.213
0.695
-0.014

1.230
-1.376
0.541
1.293
-0.033

0.247
0.199
0.600
0.225
0.974

Note. R2 = .278; Adj. R 2 = -.011; SE = 5.12; N = 15

Regression over the Overall Liking Scale
The linear model for predicting the Overall Liking Scale had an R2 = .156 and its
F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.804, p = .148). Both, the Clarifier and the
Ideator Scale’s B’s approached significance at the levels of B = -.430, p = .068 and B =
.421, p = .069 respectively. See table 4.28.1 for a full summary of this model.

Results

120

Table 4.28.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Overall Liking Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.430
0.421
0.081
-0.161

3.562
-1.879
1.869
0.290
-0.736

0.001
0.068
0.069
0.774
0.466

Note. R = .395; R 2= .156; Adj. R 2= .070; SE = 3.77; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .107), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .270, p =
.890) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.28.2).
Table 4.28.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Overall Liking Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.119
0.170
-0.341
0.231

1.093
-0.259
0.263
-0.640
0.486

0.303
0.801
0.798
0.538
0.639

Note. R2 = .107; Adj. R 2 = -.289; SE = 3.86; N = 14

When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-low (R2 = .213), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10)
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= .677 p = .623), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.28.3).
Table 4.28.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Overall Liking Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.099
0.317
0.064
-0.573

1.993
-0.237
0.690
0.096
-1.072

0.074
0.817
0.506
0.926
0.309

Note. R2 = .213; Adj. R 2 = -.102; SE = 4.13; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .447), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
2.018, p = .168). The Clarifier scale’s B was significant at the level of B = -1.078, p < .05.
See Table 4.28.4 for a full summary of this model.
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Table 4.28.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Overall Liking Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-1.078
0.355
0.644
0.207

1.937
-2.488
1.031
1.368
0.551

0.081
0.032
0.327
0.201
0.594

Note. R2 = .447; Adj. R 2 = .225; SE = 3.73; N = 15

Regression over the Overall Aesthetic Appeal Scale
The linear model for predicting the Overall Aesthetic Appeal Scale had an R2 =
.129 and its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 39) = 1.450, p = .236). The Clarifier
scale’s B approached significance at the level of B = -.421, p = .078. See Table 4.29.1 for
a full summary of this model.
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Table 4.29.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Overall Aesthetic Appeal Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.421
0.383
0.042
-0.071

3.272
-1.807
1.674
0.147
-0.319

0.002
0.078
0.102
0.884
0.752

Note. R = .360; R 2= .129; Adj. R 2= .040; SE = 4.02; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .127), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 9) = .327, p =
.853) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.29.2).
Table 4.29.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Overall Aesthetic Appeal Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.302
0.318
-0.243
0.131

1.152
-0.667
0.498
-0.460
0.280

0.279
0.522
0.630
0.656
0.786

Note. R2 = .127; Adj. R 2 = -.261; SE = 4.55; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was low (R2 = .157), its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) = .466 p =
.760), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see table 4.29.3).
Table 4.29.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Overall Aesthetic Appeal Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.059
0.282
0.004
-0.478

1.870
-0.135
0.594
0.005
-0.864

0.091
0.895
0.566
0.996
0.408

Note. R2 = .157; Adj. R 2 = -.180; SE = 4.40; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .428), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
1.867, p = .193). The Clarifier scale’s B was significant at the level of B = -1.115, p < .05.
See Table 4.29.4 for a full summary of this model.
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Table 4.29.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Overall Aesthetic Appeal Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-1.115
0.258
0.673
0.258

2.030
-2.531
0.736
1.406
0.675

0.070
0.030
0.479
0.190
0.515

Note. R2 = .428; Adj. R 2 = .199; SE = 3.84; N = 15

Regression over the Emotional Evocativeness Scale
The linear model for predicting the Emotional Evocativeness Scale had an R2 =
.234 and its F coefficient was significant (F (4, 39) = 2.978, p < .05). The Ideator scale’s
B was significant at the level of B = .530, p < .05. See Table 4.30.1 for a full summary of
this model.
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Table 4.30.1.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis All Participants:
Total Emotional Evocativeness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.133
0.530
0.160
-0.532

3.264
-0.608
2.472
0.604
-2.556

0.002
0.547
0.018
0.549
0.015

Note. R = .484; R 2= .234; Adj. R 2= .155; SE = 3.39; N = 44

When the regression was run for the Control Group participants (n=14), the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .331), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
9) = 1.112, p = .408) and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales
(see table 4.30.2).
Table 4.30.2.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Control Group:
Total Emotional Evocativeness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

0.658
0.282
-0.702
0.105

-0.147
1.659
0.505
-1.520
0.255

0.887
0.132
0.626
0.163
0.805

Note. R2 = .331; Adj. R 2 = .033; SE = 3.10; N = 14
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When the regression was run for the Factual Group participants (n=15), the
model’s fit was moderate-high (R2 = .330), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4,
10) = 1.231 p = .358), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales
(see table 4.30.3).
Table 4.30.3.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Factual Group:
Total Emotional Evocativeness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.243
0.409
0.534
-0.819

1.996
-0.629
0.967
0.858
-1.660

0.074
0.544
0.356
0.411
0.128

Note. R2 = .330; Adj. R 2 = .062; SE = 3.58; N = 15

When the regression was run for the Emotional Group participants (n=15) the
model’s fit was high (R2 = .412), yet its F coefficient was not significant (F (4, 10) =
1.752, p = .215), and there were no significant B’s for any of the FourSight scales (see
table 4.30.4).
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Table 4.30.4.
Simultaneous Linear Regression Analysis Emotional Group:
Total Emotional Evocativeness Ratings Regressed on FourSight Styles

Variable

Constant
Clarifier
Ideator
Developer
Implementer

Bs

t

p

-0.399
0.457
0.544
-0.582

2.372
-0.894
1.286
1.122
-1.505

0.039
0.392
0.227
0.288
0.163

Note. R2 = .412; Adj. R 2 = .177; SE = 3.80; N = 15

Complementary Analysis Results
Although not a focus of this research study, given the fact that this study
combined self report data (FourSight measure) with data collected from creative
products’ creativity ratings, there was an opportunity to test whether an individual’s
problem solving level of confidence (as measured by FourSight) was conducive to higher
levels of creativity. The underlying assumption in the above hypothesis is that the
stronger an individual’s preference for all tasks under the Creative Problem-Solving
framework, he or she should develop stronger Creative Problem-Solving skills in time
that in turn should be conducive to higher degrees of creativity.
To calculate participants’ total FourSight confidence level, each individual’s four
scales (preferences) scores were added to create a Total FourSight score per individual.
Note that for this analysis it is not relevant whether an individual is strong on one
preference or another, but whether he or she has a strong preference for the whole
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Creative Problem-Solving process. The range for the Total FourSight scores among the
44 participants that completed the measure was between a score of 75 and a score of 158
(minimum possible is 36; maximum possible is 180). From this range of scores, two
groups were created to test the above hypothesis, a Low Total FourSight score group
(LTF) that included all participants whose Total FourSight scores were in between 75 and
111 and a High Total FourSight score group (HTF) that included all participants whose
Total FourSight scores were in between 130 and 158. Consequently, the LTF was
comprised of 18 participants and the HTF was comprised of 15 participants (distributed
between the three treatment conditions). Due to the fact that these subsamples were
different in numbers and did not distribute normally, the Mann-Whitney U test was used
to test if there was a difference in their mean Creativity scores. The results of the U test
(U = 136, p = .782) showed that there was no significant difference for the Creativity
rating scale between the LTF (M = 12.94, SD = 4.575) and HTF (M = 12.98, SD = 4.063).
Implications for this result are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the quantitative results obtained from the statistical
analysis of the data obtained from the three sources of data included in this research
study: (a) the task reflection questionnaire; (b) the domain experts collage ratings; and (c)
the FourSight measure. Analysis, implications and recommendations derived from these
results will be presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the results presented in the previous
chapter against the proposed hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, highlight implications
of these findings for the field of creativity, review limitations of this study’s methodology
and procedures, and offer recommendations for future research studies focused on
assessing the interaction between cognition, emotion and creativity.

Interpretation of the Research Outcomes
The purpose of this research study was to assess the impact that an emotionally
laden stimulus had on an individual’s creative process and consequently, over his or her
creative products. The underlying assumption was that given an emotionally laden
stimulus, an individual’s emotional resonance mechanism (as the one described by Lubart
& Getz, 1997) would be activated, and that the latter would be conducive to high levels
of novelty in creative production. As presented in Chapter One, the main hypothesis for
this research study was the following:
The expected level of creativity (as rated by domain experts) of an individual’s
artistic work who is exposed to an emotional priming stimulus during the creative
process should be significantly higher than the expected level of creativity of an
individual’s artistic work who is exposed to a factual priming stimulus during the
creative process or to no priming stimuli at all. Consequently, the expected level
of creativity (as rated by domain experts) of an individual’s artistic work who is
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exposed to a factual priming stimulus during the creative process should be
significantly higher than the level of expected creativity of an individual’s artistic
work who is exposed to no priming stimulus at all.
From the 18 Rating Scales aggregated scores descriptive statistics presented in
Chapter Four, it is fairly clear that regarding the Creativity Scale (and the related scales
of Novel Idea and Novel use of Material) there were no significant differences between
the three groups. This was confirmed by the ANOVA tests results reported in Table 4.6
where there were no significant F coefficients for any of the 18 scales. Therefore, on a
first layer of scrutiny, the main hypothesis of this research study was not supported by the
data.
Even though the above results lend to the interpretation that the priming stimulus
(New Year’s Eve factual and emotional narrative) had no effect on the participants’
creative process and subsequent creative production as assessed by domain experts, a
closer look at the descriptive statistics reveal the possibility of something different.
Despite the fact that the Creativity Scale mean scores were similar between Control
Group (M = 12.93, SD = 3.092), Factual Group (M = 11.89, SD = 4.270), and the
Emotional Group (M = 12.56, SD = 4.476), the SD for both groups that received a
priming stimulus were more than one SD higher than the SD for the Control Group. The
same pattern repeats for those scales closely related to creativity such as the Novel Idea
Scale and the Novel Use of Material Scale (see table 5.1).
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Table 5.1.
Summary of Descriptive Statistics All Participants:
Creativity, Novel Use of Materials and Novel Idea Scales

Control Group
Variable

Creativity
Novel Use of Materials
Novel Idea

Factual Group

Emotional Group

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

12.93
11.42
12.26

3.092
3.142
2.812

11.89
10.98
11.79

4.270
4.387
3.378

12.56
12.39
12.47

4.476
4.957
4.106

Relatively speaking, this means that Control Group individuals performed fairly
even with regard to the Creativity Scale (and its related scales), whereas for those
individuals that received a narrative (either the factual or the emotional version) it seems
that the stimulus brought to play a third intervening variable that triggered a wider
spectrum of creative performance scores. The regression analyses presented on Chapter
Four casted evidence in support of an interaction effect between cognitive style as
measured by the FourSight measure and the nature of the priming stimulus in explaining
(predicting) differences in creative performance as assessed by independent domain
experts. More detail on this interaction effect will be developed later in this chapter.
With regard to the secondary hypotheses described in Chapter One, there is little
evidence in support of these. Hypothesis number two stated that, under the premise of an
emotional resonance mechanism in operation, individuals exposed to an emotional
priming stimulus should report higher degrees of engagement in creative and/or
unconventional thinking than individuals who were exposed to a factual priming stimulus
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or no stimulus at all. The Kruskall Wallis tests (H) conducted on the Task Reflection
Questionnaire showed that there was a significant difference between the self-report
scores of the Nature of Ideas Scale between the Factual Group and the Control Group.
The above means that those individuals that received the factual priming stimuli, selfreported that the ideas they entertained while creating the collage were more “out of the
box” than the ideas entertained by those who received no priming stimulus (see table
4.5.2). This is in line with analogical and combinatorial theories of creativity in which the
wider the array of stimuli an individual has available to cognitively manipulate, the
higher the probability of crafting novel combinations (Koestler, 1964; Mednick, 1962;
Simonton, 1988) However, this difference did not hold when comparing the Emotional
Group score to the Control Group score (the Emotional Group score was indeed higher
than the Control Group score, yet the difference was not statistically significant) and/or
when comparing Emotional Group score to the Factual Group score regarding the Nature
of Ideas scale. As a highlight, while individuals in the Control Group self-reported
entertaining the least innovative ideas while creating the collage, their score for the
Creativity Scale (as assessed by independent domain experts) was the highest as
compared to the two treatment groups, although this difference was not statistically
significant. Nonetheless, this brings the issue of which is the relevant locus of evaluation
for creativity as there might be a dissonance between a social appreciation of creativity
by domain experts and the appreciation of one’s own creativity. More of this will be
discussed later in this chapter.
Hypothesis number three stated that under the premise of an emotional resonance
mechanism in operation, individuals exposed to an emotional priming stimulus should
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report a greater tendency to tap deliberately into their emotions and feelings during their
creative process than individuals who were exposed to a factual priming stimulus or no
stimulus at all. The results didn’t support this hypothesis, as the Kruskall Wallis test (H)
coefficient for the Contribution of Emotion Scale was not significant meaning that there
was no difference at all between the three experimental groups. Two critical dynamics
modulating the above results regarding hypothesis number three need to be discussed in
detail. First, and as exposed in Chapter two, emotional responses operate largely
unconsciously and thus at any given time, we are only aware of a small fraction of our
emotional activity on a general basis. In this sense, it was most likely that individuals
exposed to the emotional priming stimuli indeed might have had experienced heightened
emotional activity while doing the collage task, yet they were not consciously aware of it
as to self-report it on the Task Reflection Questionnaire. Note that Emotional Group
participants reported higher levels of enjoyment and engagement than the other two
groups (See table 4.5.1, table 4.5.2, and table 4.5.3). Consequently, participants in the
Emotional group were well aware of their overall affective state, yet it seems that at
deeper levels of cognition they were not able to tell if their emotions contributed or not to
their creative process. Second, and related to the latter, the appraisal of an individual’s
emotional state and the ability to reflect upon such states depends on an individual’s
attunement to his or her emotions (probably modulated by his or her emotional
intelligence skills) and his or her over all metacognitive skills, meaning the ability to
reflect and be aware of one’s thinking (and emotions). The Task Reflection Questionnaire
indeed demanded a high level of metacognition as it prompted participants to reflect back
on their creative process at both the cognitive and emotional level. Given the young age
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of the participants (between 18 and 19 years old), it was very much likely that their
metacognitive skills were not fully developed to accurately assess the nature of their
thinking and emotional states as they worked on the collage task. Note that metacognition
and self-awareness are high order cognitive skills that many adults struggle with or never
fully develop in their lifetime.
Finally, the results discussed above didn’t cast evidence in support of the works of
an emotional resonance mechanism as described as Lubart & Getz (1997) operating in
concert with participants’ creative process. Nonetheless, the above doesn’t mean that this
mechanism doesn’t exist or that it was not operating at all for the individuals who
participated in this research study. As mentioned earlier, on one hand, there were third
variables intervening between priming stimulus and process that affected individuals’
creative process and therefore, limited the possibility to directly correlate higher degrees
of creativity and novelty with the presence of an emotionally laden stimulus. On the other
hand, and for the reason previously discussed, there might have been limitations to the
extent to which participants could self-report the level of contribution of emotions to their
creative thinking.

About Objective and Subjective Assessments to Creativity
Since Amabile (1982) introduced the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT)
framework, creativity researchers have embraced this framework for the purpose of
assessing the effects of different psychological and environmental interactions over
creative production because it provides an objective assessment to creativity. The CAT is
indeed a solid framework for the study of creativity for two reasons. First, it relies on the
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assessment of a tangible creative product and therefore, it forces to consider creativity
beyond the conception of a novel idea, but all the way through implementation to a final
product. In addition, when evaluating a creative product, creativity can be unpacked and
distinguished from other constructs and dimensions (such as technical goodness) for a
more accurate evaluation (less noise). The creative product is a tangible synthesis of the
interacting forces of creative talent, the creative process and the environment that fosters
creativity. Second, the CAT doesn’t rely on any one particular psychological definition of
creativity to determine what is creative or what is not (in fact, there is no one meta-valid
construct to creativity). On the contrary, it relies on the tacit convergence of a
sociological assessment were independent individuals, each with his or her subjective
constructs and conceptions, can agree that something possess certain qualities, in this
case, that something is indeed highly creative. Validity for this sociological assessment is
substantiated on the fact that the judges are domain experts regarding the domain under
which a product is being evaluated.
There are two sets of results presented on Chapter Four that provide some insight
into what might be a gap between a social and objective appreciation to creativity (CAT)
and a psychological and subjective appreciation to creativity (e.g. the Task Reflection
Questionnaire). First, and in relation to the Task Reflection Questionnaire, it would be
safe to hypothesize that if an individual self reports high levels of engagement with the
creative task and that the ideas he/she entertained while in the process of creating the
collage were highly out of the box, that the above should be conducive to a final product
that is assessed as highly creative by independent domain experts. However, and as table
4.1 shows, there was none but one significant correlation coefficient in the correlation
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matrix between the Task Reflection Questionnaire and the 18 Rating Scales scores.
Although it was noted earlier that the Task Reflection Questionnaire was subject to some
limitations, if the creative product is the tangible synthesis of the creative process, one
could have expected a minimum level of convergence between both data sets. Second,
when correlating participants’ FourSight scores, (individuals’ set of preferences for
Creative Problem-Solving tasks) with the 18 Rating Scales scores (product), once again
there were no significant correlation coefficients at all between the two data sets (see
Table 4.12). In addition, when testing if an individual’s confidence level with the
Creative Problem-Solving process (FourSight Total Score) translated in to higher degrees
of creative performance, there was not support in data for such relationship.
The above results may speak to a disconnect and a possible gap between the
personal appreciation of creativity and the social appreciation of creativity. In fact, the
Factual Group participants self-reported entertaining the most innovative ideas during
their creative process nonetheless, their Creativity Scale aggregated mean score was the
lowest amongst the three groups (though the differences between the there groups were
not significant). If the above is the case, there are a series of questions that need to be
addressed as to where do a subjective (psychological) assessment to creativity meet an
objective assessment to creativity (sociological).
In the first place, what is the relevant locus of evaluation for creativity? Does a
social assessment to creativity do justice to an individual’s creative efforts? With no
doubt, the choice between a social assessment and a psychological assessment to
creativity is contextual and dependent on the purpose of the assessment. In the particular
context of education, of developing one’s creative abilities and self-actualization, a social
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assessment to creativity might be even detrimental, as an individual’s creative effort
might not be recognized properly, resulting in frustration, damaged self-confidence and
increased sense that an individual is not creative at all.
In the second place, what might be the bridge between the psychological and
sociological dimensions of creativity? Boden (2004) made a clear distinction between a
psychological construct of creativity, which she termed P-creativity (P for psychological),
and a sociological construct to creativity, which she termed H-Creativity (H for
historical). On one hand, P-creativity stands for creativity as an output of cognition
(mental processes), which only needs to be meaningful to the creator himself. On the
other hand in H-creativity, the meaning, value, and the degree of novelty of a concept,
product and/or idea are socially negotiated by a group of people in time (H-creativity
takes place after an act of P-creativity). Unfortunately, Boden didn’t offer a mechanism,
bridge, and/or third construct that allows connecting the psychological and sociological
dimensions of creativity and also, didn’t specify who were the relevant social agents that
negotiate acts of H-creativity.
Finally, and in regard to the CAT domain experts’ impact in judging creativity, do
domain experts foster or inhibit creativity in their respective domains? Might it be that
domain experts (who serve as the gatekeepers to creativity to in their fields) may become
trapped in their paradigms and therefore fail to recognize creative efforts outside the
boundaries of such paradigms? In this sense, might the CAT framework be modified to
include non-experts that are free from the ruling paradigms of the domain?
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In consideration of the above, further theoretical and empirical efforts are needed
to elucidate a sound theoretical framework that balances a psychological assessment to
creativity and a sociological assessment to creativity.

Toward an Ecological Approach to Creativity
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, although there was no supporting
evidence for the primary hypothesis of this research study, the data revealed an
interaction effect triggered by the priming stimulus that affected participants’ creative
performance (the SD of the treatment groups were one SD higher than the Control
Group’s SD). In particular, and in light of the regression analyses reported in the previous
chapter, the interaction effect was confirmed when running regression analyses having
the 18 rating scales as dependent variables (each at a time), the FourSight Scale scores as
a the dependent variables, and controlling for treatment condition for each of these
regressions. The regression models reported for the Creativity Scale, Novel Idea Scale
and Novel use of Material Scale, when controlling for Emotional Group participants,
casted evidence for a negative interaction effect between the emotional stimulus and the
Clarifier preference. That means, when given an emotional priming stimulus (emotional
narrative), the higher the individual’s Clarifier preference, the lower his or her Creativity,
Novel Idea, and Novel use of Material scores as assessed by independent raters. Figure
5.1 shows the above-mentioned interaction effect for the Creativity Scale.
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Figure 5.1.

Notional Graph on the Interaction Effect Between Stimuli and
the Clarifier Cognitive Style
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An opposite pattern emerged for the Developer preference, where the regression
models suggest a positive interaction effect between cognitive style preference and the
emotional stimulus. That means, when given an emotional priming stimulus (emotional
narrative), the higher the individual’s Developer preference, the higher his or her
Creativity scores as assessed by independent raters (see figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2.
Notional Graph on the Interaction Effect Between Stimuli and
the Developer Cognitive Style
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Some remarks need to be made to better understand the scope and implications of
the above described interaction effects. First, it must be noted that the interaction effect
was triggered not by whether an individual was subject or not to a priming stimulus, but
by the nature of the stimulus if he or she happened to receive one. In this sense, the
interaction effect only surfaced when individuals were given an emotional stimulus
(regression analysis yielded significant B’s only under the emotional condition).
Therefore, there is evidence for some sort of an emotional mechanism being triggered by
the emotional stimulus, yet whether this mechanism favors or hinders the creative process
is being determined, among many possible factors, by an individual’s cognitive style.
Second, there is a complex interaction between the Clarifier preference and the
Developer preference. As described above, individuals’ creative performance shifts in
opposite directions when given an emotional stimulus, depending on whether they have a
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strong Clarifier or Developer preference. Yet as reported on Table 4.9, the highest
correlation coefficient found between FourSight preferences was precisely between the
Clarifier and the Developer scales (r > .749, p < .01). Therefore, and for this
demographic, there is a competing interaction effect; the higher the Developer preference
in an individual, which boosts creative performance under an emotional priming
stimulus, the higher the Clarifier preference should be, which in turn hinders creative
performance under the emotional priming stimulus. The final effect of the above
interaction should be dependant on the strength (or absolute value) of the preference
scale’s B and the relative scores between the Developer and Clarifier preference for any
given individual. In the case of the Creativity Scale, the B was stronger for the Clarifier
preference (B = -1.251, p < .01) than for the Developer preference (B = .871, p = .065),
so there should be a tendency towards a detrimental effect to creativity given the
emotional priming stimulus. Finally, these results offer interesting insights regarding
FourSight taxonomy of Creative Problem-Solving preferences. Research has offered little
empirical evidence to differentiate substantially the Clarifier and the Developer
preferences (Puccio, 2002). When correlating the FourSight scales to other measures or
performance indexes, and probably due to the fact that both of these preferences rely
heavily on analytical skills, the Clarifier and Developer scales have tended to move in the
same direction and patterns (Puccio, 2002). The results obtained in this research study
finally point out a substantial difference between both preferences. For some reason,
Clarifiers tend to get hindered in their creative performance by emotional stimuli, while
Developers tend to have a boost in creative performance when dealing with emotional
stimuli.
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Third, and related to detrimental effect of emotional stimuli for Clarifiers, it is
interesting to note that when correlating the Task Reflection Questionnaire with the
FourSight scores, there was a high correlation between the Contribution of the Narrative
Scale scores and the Clarifier Scale scores (rs = .557, p < .01). Note that this coefficient
was calculated considering both Factual and Emotional group participants. In this sense,
and according to FourSight theory, one would have expected that if an individual has a
high Clarifier preference, receiving a narrative (information) should contribute to the
Clarifier’s creative thinking by allowing him or her to craft a comprehensive picture of
the challenge at hand (Puccio, 2002). However, the results described above suggest that
not every bit of information or stimulus serves the Clarifier’s purpose, for if the stimulus
is highly emotionally laden, it will likely hinder the individual’s creative output (as was
the case in this research study). Moreover, though the high Clarifier individual might
think that receiving more information is better, he or she may not be aware that
emotionally laden stimuli is detrimental to his or her creative performance. With regard
to other possible interaction effects modulating the scores of the remaining assessed
scales (besides the Creativity, Novel Use of Materials and Novel Idea Scales), there were
no other significant regression models in the data.
This level of awareness and detail regarding interaction effects is a huge step
toward a deep ecological approach to creativity. In other words, and as expressed by
Harington (1990), the results discussed above moves us closer to a deep understanding of
what works for who, when, and why in terms of eliciting creative behavior in oneself and
others. Puccio et al. (2007) offered the systems approach to creativity in an attempt to
portray the interaction forces of person, process, press, and product. FourSight theory
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(Puccio, 2002) in turn, offers a connection between the dimensions of person (cognitive
style) and process (Creative Problem-Solving framework). The results obtained in this
research study build on the above frameworks by offering a deeper understanding of the
interaction between the nature of the information being processed, emotion and cognitive
style.
Implications of the Findings of this Research Study
There are three key implications derived from the findings of this research study.
First, and as suggested earlier, further efforts should be done to close the gap between a
psychological and sociological appreciation to creativity. In this regard, it would be great
if the CAT framework could be expanded in order to factor in an individual’s creative
effort, creative process and learning (growth) along with the social assessment of a
creative product. In addition, when utilizing the CAT framework for assessing creative
products, it is recommended to complement its use with self-report assessments to one’s
creative products and thus, measure the level of convergence between both assessment
lenses. If there are indeed discrepancies between both assessment approaches, then
researchers should address such discrepancies, for example, by promoting a dialogue
between the individual and the domain expert panel. This way, both parties could gain
mutual and deeper understanding regarding the mechanisms and underlying criteria
ruling their appreciation to creativity. This dialogue dynamic between individual and
domain experts could allow an individual to further develop his/her metacognitive skills
and self-awareness in regard to his/her creative process. Also, by understanding the
parameters by which domain experts judge creativity (the gatekeepers in one’s field), one
could make a deliberate choice when engaging in creative endeavors of either abiding to
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these parameters or to explore outside the boundaries of such parameters (with the
awareness that the latter might go unrecognized by the field).
The second key implication has to do with the evidence found for the interaction
effect between cognitive styles, the affective nature of information, and creative
production effectiveness. Up front, deeper knowledge about this interaction will allow
practitioners in the field of creativity (consultants, trainers, facilitators, and teachers) to
be more effective in eliciting creative behavior by adequately selecting the nature of the
stimuli and techniques according to their audience’s cognitive style profile. In short, this
findings will allow practitioners to adopt a more ecological approach to stimulating one’s
and others creative behavior. In this line of thought, the deeper the understanding of the
multiple interactions that take place during creative production, the higher the probability
of designing effective creativity heuristic and interventions.
The third key implication relates to the need of gaining an even deeper and more
ecological understanding of the creative phenomenon. The interaction effect found in this
study between cognitive style and affective nature of stimuli is a clear indication of the
tight interplay between emotion, cognition and creativity (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, &
Staw, 2005; Dietrich, 2004; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2007),
and only the tip of the iceberg in this regard. As Duncan and Barret (2007) suggested, the
distinction held in past years between cognition and emotion is more phenomenological
rather than ontological. Consequently, future research efforts geared toward
understanding creative cognition should include and assess both cognitive and emotional
dimensions of creativity and the way that one modulates the other and vice versa. As
such, further efforts should be directed specifically at unveiling the emotional
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mechanisms affecting creative cognition, in the like of the one proposed by Lubart and
Getz (1997). Yet even more important, efforts should be directed at understanding the
combinations of person, process, press and stimuli, and the specific contexts in which
particular combinations of these factors are conducive to higher degrees of creativity.

Limitations of the Study
The present research study is not absent of methodological limitations. First and
most critical, the sample size employed in this research study was small (65 participants
and only 44 who completed the FourSight measure). A larger sample base, with a
minimum of at least 25 individuals per treatment condition (completing 100% of the
assessment procedures) would have yielded stronger statistical figures, which in turn
would strengthen the findings discussed in this chapter. The above limitation was
exacerbated when cutting and grouping the data by treatment condition and cognitive
style for the purpose of analyzing the interaction effects discussed earlier.
Second, although there was support in the literature for text based priming stimuli
as being effective in eliciting an emotional response, better emotional priming stimuli
could have been employed to deliberately tap into emotional cognition and creativity. For
example, audiovisual stimuli (a movie) and/or smell (use of scents) are powerful stimuli
that have a strong potential for evoking emotional responses. Of course the possibility to
design such an experiment that includes audiovisual stimuli and/or smell stimuli would
depend on resources available to the researcher. As a way to enhance the effectiveness of
text based emotional priming stimuli, Emotional Group participants could have been
explicitly instructed, after reading the emotionally laden story, to explore and focus on
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their emotions about the New Year’s Eve, and then to use those emotions to represent as
creatively as possible what the New Year’s Eve theme meant to them in the collage
composition. Note that in the research design employed for this experiment, Emotional
Group participants were given the emotionally laden narrative, but then were only
instructed to represent as creatively as possible what the New Year’s Eve theme meant to
them in the collage composition without an explicit emphasis on having them focus on
their emotions for creating their collages.
Third, in an effort to better understand the scope of influence of emotion in the
creative process and to also better understand the interactions effects between emotion
and aspects of cognition, the research design could have included complementary
assessment instruments. Based on the review of the literature exposed in Chapter Two,
researchers looking forward to replicate this research study should definitely include the
Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI) (Averill, 1999) as part of the psychometric battery
of instruments used to generate participants’ creative profiles. In this line of thought, it
would be interesting to calculate correlations between the FourSight preferences and the
ECI scales. Given the fact that the ECI has correlated highly and positively with tests of
creativity (divergent thinking) and to the production of creative products (Ivcevich et al.,
2007), what interaction should be expected between the Clarifier Scale, the ECI, and
emotionally laden stimuli? In addition to the assessment of creative products (CAT), the
methodology could be enhanced by including other creativity tests aimed at probing into
specific components, stages or aspects of the creative process in order to assess the
impact of emotionally stimuli in such processes. For example, the Torrance Test of
Creative Thinking (TTCT) (Torrance, 1974) could be included to assess divergent
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thinking skills (originality, fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and resistance to premature
closure) essential to divergent phases of the creative process while the Remote Associates
Test (Mednick, 1967) could be used to test synthesis and convergent thinking skills
essential to convergent phases of the creative process.
Fourth and with regard to the judging protocol, having a larger pool of judges
would have resulted in even stronger inter-rater reliability coefficients (although the ones
obtained in this research study were acceptable). As expressed earlier in this chapter with
regard to the nature of the judges or raters, researchers should ponder whether to have a
mix panel between a majority of domain experts and some outsiders as a means to control
for the possible limitation of domain experts being trapped by the ruling paradigms and
standards of creativity of their respective field. If the level of convergence of such a panel
is high with regard to the Creativity Scale, then it is even safer to claim that such products
rated high in creativity indeed posses such quality. With regard to the rating procedure
itself, although collages were arranged in a random and unique configuration for each
round of ratings (per independent rater), the order of the scales within the rating template
sheet was kept the same for all judges for all ratings. This could have caused a halo effect
due to the fact that rating each collage in terms of the Creativity Scale first, probably
influenced the rating of all subsequent scales. In fact the correlations between the
Creativity Scale and the remaining 17 scales were all very high and significant at the
level of p < .01 (see table 4.10). Therefore, it is suggested that in addition to randomizing
the sequence by which raters rate the pool of collages, the order of the scales within the
rating template sheet should also be randomized.
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Finally, caution must be taken when generalizing the findings of this research
study. First, and as mentioned above, the sample size was small and the demographic
quite specific (undergraduate college students). Second, all the analysis was based on the
assessment of an artistic creative product. Do the interaction effects found in this research
study transfer to other domains of creativity like scientific, business and/or academic
creativity? In this line of thought, further research should be conducted in domains
different from artistic creativity to assess whether the interaction effects found between
nature of the stimuli and Creative Problem-Solving style still hold.

Future Recommendations
In light of this research study’s findings the following research questions are
recommended to researchers wanting to assess the interaction between emotion, creative
cognition, creative style, and creative behavior: (a) why is it that Clarifiers’ creative
performance is hindered given an emotionally laden stimulus?; (b) what mechanisms and
variables are governing the interaction between the Clarifier preference and the
emotionally laden stimulus that leads to a negative impact on creative performance?; (c)
why is it that Developers’ creative performance is boosted given an emotionally laden
stimulus?; (d) what mechanisms and variables are governing the interaction between the
Developer preference and the emotionally laden stimulus that leads to a positive impact
on creative performance?; (e) are there other qualities of information and stimuli
(different from level of emotional charge) that would reveal interaction effects between
the nature of the stimuli and the Ideator and Implementer FourSight preferences?; (f)
what is the scope (breadth and depth) of influence of emotion in the each of the steps and
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processes of creative cognition?; and (g) are the interaction effects found in this research
study domain specific or domain general? These are some of the many questions that the
findings of this research study open for future creativity research focused on unveiling
and understanding the myriad of possible interaction effects that modulate creative
cognition.

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the findings of this research study in contrast to the main
research question and hypotheses outlined in Chapter One. Implications regarding the
findings were discussed for both creativity practitioners and researchers. Finally
limitations of the present research study were exposed and recommendations were
outlined for future research focused in understanding the interactions between emotion,
cognitive style and creativity.
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Creative Collage Instruction sheet
a) Make sure you have the following materials:
•
•
•
•

Set of scrapbook papers
Glue
White cardboard
Scissors

If you are missing any of these materials, please inform the researcher in order to replace the package or
supply you with the missing material(s).

b) With the given set of materials, you have to create a collage composition
that represents as creatively as possible what the following theme means to
you: “New Year’s Eve”.
c) You will be given 10 minutes to examine the materials and to start planning for
creative ways to outline your collage composition. The researcher will give you a
warning when you have 2 minutes left so that you make yourself ready to start working.

d) You will have up to 30 minutes to create the collage composition. You are only
allowed to use the white cardboard, scrapbook papers, glue, and scissors provided in your
set of materials. Do not start working until the researcher explicitly instructs you to do
so. The researcher will give you a warning when you have 5 minutes left so that you start
finalizing your collage. If you don’t finish within the 30 minutes, please leave your
collage as it is on top of the table.

e) Upon completion of your collage and/or once the 30 minutes time limit is over, please
complete the “task debrief questionnaire” (pink sheet of paper inside your envelope).

f) Finally, please leave your collage composition on top of the table and put the consent
form, art proficiency questionnaire and the task debrief questionnaire back into the
envelope.
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Creative Collage Instruction sheet
a) Make sure you have the following materials:
•
•
•
•

Set of scrapbook papers
Glue
White cardboard
Scissors

If you are missing any of these materials, please inform the researcher in order to replace the package or
supply you with the missing material(s).

b) With the given set of materials, you have to create a collage composition
that represents as creatively as possible what the following theme means to
you: “New Year’s Eve”.
c) You will be given 10 minutes to read the enclosed narrative (green sheet of paper in
your envelope), examine the materials and start planning for creative ways to outline
your collage composition. The researcher will give you a warning when you have 2
minutes left so that you make yourself ready to start working. Please make sure you have
read the narrative before the two-minute warning. This narrative is meant to give you
deeper context over the New Year’s Eve theme.
d) You will have up to 30 minutes to create the collage composition. You are only
allowed to use the white cardboard, scrapbook papers, glue, and scissors provided in your
set of materials. Do not start working until the researcher explicitly instructs you to do
so. The researcher will give you a warning when you have 5 minutes left so that you start
finalizing your collage. If you don’t finish within the 30 minutes, please leave your
collage as it is on top of the table.
e) Upon completion of your collage and/or once the 30 minutes time limit is over, please
complete the “task debrief questionnaire” (pink sheet of paper inside your envelope).
f) Finally, please leave your collage composition on top of the table and put the consent
form, art proficiency questionnaire and the task debrief questionnaire back into the
envelope.
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Emotional Narrative:
Christmas, with its gift giving and feasting, had drawn to a close. My favorite holidayNew Year’s Eve- was approaching. The planning for this New Year’s Eve was particularly
special. Mother was unusually busy baking all week. There were so many scrumptious cakes and
delicacies that we (my little sister and I) were not allowed to touch them, under peril of our lives!
I remember her cooking a large leg of pork, a turkey, and a Virginia ham. On the big day, at about
7pm, my mother set our dining room table with all of these wondrous dishes, and the irresistible
mixed aroma filled the room. My father prepared the drinks table with bottles of alcohol of all
imaginable colors and shapes. Everything looked beautiful.
Father instructed both my little sister and I to get dressed in our best clothes. Mother spent
forever combing our hair, almost a thread at a time. I didn’t quite understand what made this New
Year’s Eve so special. Just before the chimes began to sound from our local church, Father
stepped outside our front door and waited there until the chimes had ceased. When he returned, I
could not believe my eyes. It was like a dream. I was immediately transported seven years back. I
could vividly see my brother Frank walking out onto the porch wearing his shining uniform. That
3rd of August had been a grey day for the family and particularly for me. Frank and I had shared
room for as long as I could remember. He was my buddy, hero and baseball mentor! I could still
hear his voice as he waved goodbye saying, “I will be back…I will be back…Promise”. That
night, when I saw him standing at the door, I felt a burst of joy, excitement, sadness and
nervousness all mixed at the same time. It was like being shaken in the vortex of a big wave. I
found myself running as fast as I could to our room digging into the bottom drawer of the cabinet
to find the Yankee’s cap he had given me the day he left. I put the cap on - messing up Mom’s
hard work on my hair - and at full speed I ran back into the living room. I jumped into his lap,
embracing him like a piton for I don’t how long. After two hours (actually only 10 minutes)
Father pulled me away to let Frank literally breathe.
After our family dinner, Father opened our door and invited our neighbors into our home,
to celebrate that special New Year’s Eve. I tried to keep my eyes open to enjoy Franks’ stories,
the food and the laughter, but I was not able to stay awake very long. I will never forget that day.
It is one of the most happiest I have ever known.
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Factual Narrative:
New Year’s traditions are fascinating. One of the most common is the making of New
Year's resolutions. That tradition dates back to the early Babylonians. Popular modern resolutions
might include the promise to lose weight or quit smoking. The early Babylonian's most popular
resolution was to return borrowed farm equipment.
The tradition of using a baby to signify the New Year began in Greece around 600 BC. It
was the tradition at that time to celebrate their god of wine, Dionysus, by parading a baby in a
basket. This represented the rebirth of that god as the spirit of fertility. Early Egyptians also used
a baby as a symbol of rebirth. Although the early Christians denounced the practice as pagan, the
popularity of the baby as a symbol of rebirth forced the Church to reevaluate its position. The
Church finally allowed its members to celebrate the New Year with a baby, substituting the baby
Jesus for Dionysus. The Germans have used the symbol of a baby for the New Year since the
fourteenth century, and brought the image to colonial America.
It has been thought that one could affect the luck you have throughout the coming year by
what you do or eat on the first day of the year. For that reason, it has become common for folks to
celebrate the first few minutes of a brand new year in the company of family and friends. Parties
often last into the middle of the night after the ringing in of a new year. It was once believed that
the first visitor on New Year's Day would bring either good luck or bad luck the rest of the year.
It was particularly lucky if that visitor happened to be a tall dark-haired man. Traditional New
Year foods are also thought to bring luck. Many cultures believe that anything in the shape of a
ring is good luck, because it symbolizes coming full circle, completing a year's cycle. For that
reason, the Dutch believe that eating donuts on New Year's Day will bring good fortune. Many
parts of the U.S. celebrate the New Year by consuming black-eyed peas typically accompanied by
either hog jowls or ham. Black-eyed peas and other legumes have been considered good luck in
other cultures as well. The hog, and thus its meat, is considered lucky because it symbolizes
prosperity. Cabbage is another good luck vegetable that is consumed on New Year's Day by
many. Cabbage leaves are also considered a sign of prosperity, being representative of paper
currency. In some regions, rice is a lucky food that is eaten on New Year's Day.
The song, Auld Lang Syne, is sung at the stroke of midnight in almost every Englishspeaking country in the world to ring in the New Year. Early variations of the song were sung
prior to 1700 and inspired the modern rendition. An old Scotch tune, Auld Lang Syne literally
means old long ago, or simply, the good old days.
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Narrative Evaluation Scale:

Dear Participant,
Please read the narrative that is enclosed in the packet. Once you have finished
reading it, please proceed to rate it in terms of the level of emotion contained in the
narrative. On one hand, a rating of (1) means that the narrative has almost no emotional
charge, or in other words, that it is purely factual. On the other hand, a rating of (7)
means that the narrative has a high emotional charge.

According to your opinion, how emotional was the narrative you read? Please mark with
an “(X)” the level of emotional charge.

Absolutely
factual content

Balanced
content

1

2
7

3

4

Absolutely
Emotional content

5

6
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Rating Dimensions &Description:

1.

Creativity: Using your own subjective definition of creativity, the degree to which the design is
creative.

2.

Novel idea: The degree to which the design itself is original or striking especially in conception or
style.

3.

Novel use of materials: The degree to which the design shows novel use of materials, i.e. paper being
altered, 3-dimensional, unique usage of background paper.

4.

Liking: Your own subjective reaction to the design; the degree to which you like it.

5.

Overall aesthetic appeal: In general, the degree to which the design is pleasing in appearance as a
whole.

6.

Pleasing Placement of Shapes: The degree to which there is an aesthetic appeal in the placement of
shapes in the design.

7.

Pleasing use of Color: The degree to which the design shows an aesthetically pleasing use of color.

8.

Technical Goodness: Using you own subjective criteria for technical goodness, the degree to which
the work is good technically.

9.

Overall Organization: The degree to which the design shows a coherent unity or functioning whole,
illustrates overall organization.

10. Neatness: The degree to which the neatness is shown in the work, the design is free from irregularity
or untidiness.
11. Effort Evident: The degree to which the design shows effort evident, the placement and design seems
to have been done to achieve a particular end.
12. Balance: The degree to which the design shows good balance, an aesthetically pleasing integration of
elements.
13. Variation of Shapes: The degree to which the design shows wide usage of the various shapes
available, how many different shapes were incorporated in the design.
14. Degree of Symmetry: The degree to which the overall design is symmetrical, beauty of form arising
from balanced proportions.
15. Expression of Meaning: The degree to which the overall design conveys the meaning of New Years
Eve
16. Detail: The small elements that collectively constitute completeness, the amount of detail in the
design.
17. Complexity: The level of complexity or how intricate the overall design is.

18. Emotional Evocativeness: The degree to which the design expresses emotional meaning
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Creative Collage Rating Template
Rater #
Collage#
Creativity

Low
1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

Pleasing use of
color

1

2

Pleasing use of
shapes

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

Aesthetic
appeal

1

2

Emotional
evocativeness

1

2

Novel use of
material
Novel idea
Effort evident
Variation in
shapes
Detail
Complexity
Technical
goodness
Organization
Neatness
Balance

Symmetry
Expression of
meaning
Liking

3

Medium
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Low
3

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

23

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

24

25

High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High
23
High

Medium
13

23
High

Medium

Low
3

18

Medium

Low
3

17

Medium

Low
3

16

Medium

Low
3

15

Medium

Low
3

14

Medium

Low
3

13

Medium

Low
3

22

Medium

Low
3

21

Medium

Low
3

20

Medium

Low
3

19

Medium

Low
3

18

Medium

Low
3

17

Medium

Low
3

16

Medium

Low
3

High
15

Medium

Low
3

14

Medium

Low
3

13

23
High
23
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Theme:
Understanding the Creative Process
Initiative:
Assessing the role of emotions as an associative mechanism within the creative process
Thesis Title:
Emotions as an intervening variable in the creative process

Rationale and questions:
The purpose of this study is to unveil, through an experimental quantitative
research design, the power of emotions as an associative mechanism within the creative
process. The cognitive science paradigm, the dominant paradigm governing the last
several decades of psychological research, has systematically neglected the study of
emotion (LeDoux, 1996). The scientific study and modeling of the creative process has
been no exception to this research approach (Runco, 2007). For example, the Creative
Problem Solving process (Isaksen, Dorval & Treffinger, 2000; Noller, Parnes, & Biondi,
1976; Osborn, 1963; Parnes, 1981; Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2005; Treffinger,
Isaksen, & Dorval, 1994), central to the Creative Studies curriculum dictated at the
International Center for Studies in Creativity, and one of the most widely studied creative
process models, falls into the category of the cognitive-rational-semantic theories of
creativity (Treffinger, Isaksen, & Firestien, 1983)
With the advent of emotional intelligence theory (Goleman, 1995; Salovey &
Mayer, 1990) and the findings in the field of neuroscience about the role of emotion in
cognition (Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004; Duncan & Barret, 2007; Flaherty 2005;
LeDoux, 1996; Stein 2007), the field of creativity is beginning to acknowledge the close

Appendix I

177

interplay between cognition and emotion in driving the creative process (Amabile,
Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Boden, 1998; Damasio, 2001; Dietrich, 2004; Fuchs,
Kumar, & Porter, 2007; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Puccio et al., 2005). This suggests a more
direct role of emotion within the creative process, in particular, with regard to the
associative mental processes that generate novel output. Lubart and Getz (1997) have
suggested that emotional associative mechanisms might yield associations between more
remote concepts than those derived from factual driven associative mechanisms.
Therefore, an emotional driven creative process might be conducive to higher degrees of
novelty than a cognitive-factual driven process. Given the above rationale, the primary
research question proposed for this research study is:
∗ Will individuals exposed to an emotional priming stimulus (before engaging in a
creative task) exhibit higher degrees of creativity than individuals exposed to a
rational-factual priming stimulus?

Statement of significance:
The proposed study builds on the momentum gained by emotional intelligence
research, which has redirected many researchers’ efforts to better understand the nature
of emotion. With regard to creativity, the role of emotion in the creative process has
traditionally been accounted for governing motivation, modulating the affective states
that are conducive to creativity, and fueling creative drive (Amabile, 1985; Boden, 1998;
Collins & Amabile, 1999; Damasio, 2001; Flaherty, 2005; Hennessey, 1999; Levine,
2007; Lubart & Getz, 1997; Runco 2007; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Treffinger, 1980).
Nevertheless, there is a recent body of research that has casted evidence in support of a
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broader scope of influence of emotion in creativity. For example, with regard to the
creative personality, research on Emotional Creativity (EC) (Averill, 1999; Fuchs et al.,
2007; Ivcevich, Brackett, & Mayer, 2007) have yielded correlates between EC, openness
to experience, the creative personality, and creative performance (Dollinger, Urban &
James, 2004; Fuchs et al., 2007; McCrae, 1987). On the other hand, the field of
organizational psychology has stressed the relationship between Emotional Intelligence
(EI) and leadership (Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2001; Zhou & George, 2003).
Leadership in turn, has been related with the climate that fosters creative performance
(Ekvall, 1996, 1999; Puccio, Murdock, & Mance, 2007). In spite of this, the research of
the role of emotion as an associative mechanism within the creative process (Amabile et
al. 2005; Isen, 1999; Russ & Schafer, 2006) is still scarce. Consequently, the relationship
between emotion and the associative mechanisms underlying the creative process remains
to be mostly theoretical (Amabile et al., 2005; Lubart & Getz, 1997). This study is
intended to add to the empirical body of research supporting the power of emotion as an
associative mechanism for creativity. If emotionally laden stimuli elicit more powerful
associations than emotional neutral stimuli, and the former lead to higher degrees of
creativity, then the results of this study would demand a reconsideration of the role of
emotion in the creative process (beyond governing creative drive) and creativity
facilitation methods.

Research Methodology:
The research methodology is quantitative and involves two experimental groups
and one control group. The sample, approximately 75 individuals, will be drawn from a
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pool of undergraduate students enrolled in Creative Studies courses CRS 205 (three
sections), at Buffalo State College, NY. Individuals will be instructed to perform a
creative task consisting in a scrap paper collage according to Amabile’s (1982) testing
protocol. In order to control for artistic proficiency, a questionnaire will be used to assess
participant’s art proficiency level. Individuals will randomly be assigned to either the
control group or one of the experimental groups using a web-based random number
generator (http://www.randomizer.org). Note that the configuration of the groups will be
determined before engaging in the creative task and will be kept as such for the whole
experiment. For the control group, there will be no priming stimuli before engaging in the
collage task. On the other hand, both experimental groups will be primed (treatment
condition) with either an emotional laden stimulus or a rational-factual stimulus
(emotionally neutral) before engaging in the collage task. The stimuli, with which both
experimental groups will be primed, will be a short narrative of a universal theme such as
New Year’s Eve. This narrative will have two forms: (a) emotional laden narrative and (b)
rational-factual narrative. The emotional narrative is written in first person style to
increase the overall emotional charge of the narrative. On the other hand, the
factual narrative is written in third person style to make is as emotionally neutral as
possible. The validity of the priming stimulus, meaning that the emotional narrative
indeed elicits emotions while the factual narrative is emotionally neutral will be validated
following Amabile’s (1985) protocol. First, a focus group of graduate students (4
individuals) will initially proof read and provide feedback to refine the narratives.
Subsequently, a panel of at least 20 individuals will rate whether the narratives are either
emotionally laden or emotionally neutral (Amabile, 1985). After the experiment, relevant
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domain experts will assess the degree of creativity of the collages according to Amabile’s
(1982) consensual assessment technique. Each judge will use a likert-type scale to rate
the degree of creativity of each collage. Inter-rater reliability will be calculated to check
the validity of the experiment. Statistical comparison of mean scores between
experimental groups and control group creativity scores will be used to test if there is a
significant difference in the level of creativity exhibited and whether or not the
hypothesis and theoretical stance are supported by the data. Judges will be asked to
evaluate secondary variables besides creativity level (e.g. technical proficiency, neatness,
variety of shapes, complexity, etc…) and a factor analysis will be conducted to ensure
that creativity ratings cluster into a stand-alone factor (meaning that judges produced a
pure creativity score). In addition, the FourSight® measure (a cognitive style measure)
will be administered to enrich the data analysis.
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Learning goals:
∗ Improve my research skills.
∗ Improve my writing skills; my intention is to actively contribute to the field of
creativity with future scholarly publications.
∗ Have a thorough understanding of the body of literature in the creative studies
field.
∗ Have a thorough understanding of the relationship between emotions and
creativity.
∗ Have a thorough understanding of the scope of influence of emotions in
creativity.

Outcomes:
∗
∗
∗
∗

An approved thesis to complete my Master’s degree in Creative Studies.
Bound manuscript.
Online submission to web publisher.
Scholarly Article to publish in peer reviewed journal related to the field of
creativity.
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Timeline:
Thesis Task

Expected date of completion.

Concept paper

Apr-08

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Apr-08

Agreement with CRS 205 instructors

May-08

Definition of a sample

Jun-08

Submit Human Subject proposal

Aug-08

Validation of experimental priming stimuli

Aug-08

Chapter 1: Rationale / Research questions

Sep-08

Perform research experiment

Sep-08

Judge Ratings

Sep-08

Chapter 3: Methodology

Oct-08

Data analysis

Jan-09

Chapter 4: Results

Feb-09

Chapter 5: Discussion

Apr-09

Write research paper for peer reviewed journal

May-09

Principal investigator: Diego E. Uribe
Faculty advisor: Dr. Gerard J. Puccio
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Participant Consent Form
** You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this research study **
1. Purpose:
The purpose of this study is to measure an individual’s creativity level through the
evaluation of an artistic creative collage by domain experts.
2. Procedure:
You will be asked to:
- Fill in an artistic proficiency questionnaire
- Complete a creative cognitive style measure**
- Create a scrap paper collage composition
- Fill in a task debrief questionnaire.
** This will not be done the day of the experiment, but in a later period of time yet to be determined.

3. Time required:
The total time required for this experiment is one hour and fifteen minutes.
4. Risks:
It is not anticipated that this study will present any risk to you.
5. Your rights as a subject:
- To withdraw yourself by whatsoever reason and at any time from the study.
- All information will be handled confidentially. Your information will not be
disclosed to anybody, except for the researcher and his advisor, in any way that is
possible to link your identity to any other variable under study.
and

- At the end of the project, you have the right to request a debrief of the rationale
general results of the study. To do so, please email the researcher at:
duribel@gmail.com and use as a header for the email: Research Study Debrief.

6. If you have any concerns about your treatment as a participant in this study, please call
Dr. Gerard Puccio, Departament of Creative Studies, Buffalo State College, (716) 8786223.
I have read the above information and willingly consent to participate in this study.
Signed________________________________________________
Date:________________
Print
Name:_________________________________________________________________

